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INTRODUCTION
The Declaration of Independence proclaims that governments derive “their just powers from the consent of the governed.”1 To condition the federal government’s powers upon
such consent, the Constitution vested responsibility for exercising certain basic powers, including the power to make rules of
private conduct, in the branch of government most directly accountable to the governed, Congress.2 Members of Congress
would then bear personal responsibility for the exercise of
these legislative powers, and the governed could withhold consent by refusing to reelect these legislators. This arrangement
was central to the compact that the Framers of the Constitution
offered to the people.3 As James Madison wrote in Federalist No.
51, “A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government . . . .”4

1. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
3. See infra Part I.
4. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).

No. 1]

Consent of the Governed

215

That members of Congress bear such personal responsibility
is a constitutional norm. As originally conceived, this norm required Congress to make all the rules of private conduct. Given
the quantity of rules now being issued, it is hard to believe
Congress could bring itself to make them all.5 This limitation
on Congress’s ability to provide rules impedes the courts from
fully enforcing the norm as originally conceived.
The Supreme Court has, however, erred in how it dealt with
this impediment to judicial enforcement. It has held that Congress
does not delegate its legislative powers so long as it states an
“intelligible principle” to guide agency rulemaking.6 Thus,
though the norm as originally understood required Congress
itself to make the rules of private conduct, the “intelligible
principle” test allows Congress to leave such rulemaking to
agencies so long as Congress says enough about the goals that
the agency should pursue in making the rules. “Enough,”
however, is a question of degree. Judges would inevitably have
difficulty in comparing the degree to which statutes guide
agency rulemaking given the quite different topics of regulation. The test is therefore mush and, as such, judicially unmanageable and unenforceable. The upshot is that Congress can
outsource responsibility for the laws by giving lip service to the
vaguest of goals.7
Emblematic of this trivializing of the norm, some of the Justices’
opinions began a half century ago to call it the “nondelegation
doctrine.” This label conceals the norm’s vital consent-of-thegoverned purpose, much as if equal protection of the laws was
5. My past scholarship on delegation minimized the need for Congress to delegate legislative powers, at least after a period of transition. See, e.g., DAVID
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 135–52, 165–79 (1993) [hereinafter POWER WITHOUT
RESPONSIBILITY] (arguing delegation creates incentives for Congress to make regulation more complex and that, without those incentives, Congress could enact a
simpler set of rules that would achieve regulatory objectives more effectively and
efficiently); see also DAVID SCHOENBROD, RICHARD B. STEWART & KATRINA M.
WYMAN, BREAKING THE LOGJAM: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION THAT WILL WORK
(2010) [hereinafter LOGJAM]. Nonetheless, I now see that the Court could not enforce the original norm completely without risking overwhelming political opposition, as discussed in Part II of this Article.
6. The “intelligible principle” language first appeared in J.W. Hampton, Jr., &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy v.
United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, argues that only later did the Court begin to use it as
a test of the constitutionality of statutes. Id. at 2139–41 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
7. See infra Part II.
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called the “nondifferentiation doctrine” or freedom of the press
was called the “nonfiltering principle.”8
The “nondelegation doctrine” label thus makes congressional
responsibility sound like a technicality beloved only by cranks
who oppose regulatory protection, although the overwhelming
majority of the governed want such protection. In my own experience as an environmental advocate, I concluded that delegation often allows members of Congress to avoid blame for
failing to deliver regulatory protection. Because the governed
overwhelmingly want both protection and a Congress accountable for the rules of private conduct, I refer to the “consent-ofthe-governed norm” rather than the “nondelegation doctrine.”9
Yet, if the Court suddenly began enforcing the norm, even a
less stringent version than the original norm, the reversal could
cast a pall of doubt over the validity of a massive number of
rules in the Code of Federal Regulation. It would take many
years of litigation to determine the validity of these rules and
years more, if not decades, for Congress to repair the resulting
chinks in the regulatory system. Thus, our nation’s reliance on
massive delegation also impedes enforcement of the norm.
This Article argues that the Court could find a path through
the impediments, including Congress’s inability to provide all
the needed rules and the present reliance on delegation, to enforce the norm to a substantial, though incomplete, extent. The
path should begin by distinguishing between the original norm
and the impediments to its full judicial enforcement. The distinction between the norm and the impediments to its judicial
enforcement would make clear that, regardless of the inability
of the Court to fully enforce the norm, members of Congress,
having sworn to uphold the Constitution,10 are honor bound to
comply with the norm to the extent practical.
The Court would then be left with a constitutional duty to
follow a path that enables it to enforce the norm to the extent
permitted by the impediments to judicial enforcement. One
8. The earliest use of the term “nondelegation doctrine” or “non-delegation
doctrine” in a Supreme Court opinion is in a passage citing with approval Professor
Kenneth Culp Davis’s call to explicitly abandon the doctrine. McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 274 n.27 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing 1 KENNETH
CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 2.01–2.05 (1958)).
9. For the points summarized in this paragraph, see infra Parts II–III.
10. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
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step on this path would be to hold that the Court will strike
down significant new regulations whose promulgation the legislative process has not approved. The idea that Congress
should vote on significant new regulations has a bipartisan
pedigree, yet both parties in Congress—each in its own way—
assiduously avoid putting the idea into practice.11 As Part IV.B
will show, the Court can construct a test of the significance of
regulations that is judicially manageable. The Court should forewarn Congress of its intention to take this step so that Congress
could organize itself to vote on the promulgation of these significant new regulations. A subsequent step might be to force
Congress to gradually take responsibility for the most important preexisting regulations.
Implicit in this approach is that impediments to judicial enforcement often require the Court to adopt tests that are less
stringent than the norms themselves. Such underenforcement
of constitutional norms may seem strange because the Court
does not exactly advertise it, but it happens nonetheless. An
example discussed in Part III.A is the equal protection norm,
which forbids states from treating people unequally without
fair reason. Impeded by concern for usurping the policymaking
prerogatives of states in run-of-the-mill cases, the Court uses a
deferential test allowing some violations of the norm. Part IV.A
shows that the Court changes the tests it applies when it perceives better ways to skirt impediments to the judicial enforcement of constitutional norms. Thus, by “constitutional
norm,” I mean a requirement of the Constitution and by “test”
I mean a standard that courts use to avoid impediments to full
enforcement of a constitutional norm.
This Article’s proposed approach to judicial enforcement
would provide less complete compliance with the consent-ofthe-governed norm than the approach advocated in my earlier
scholarship.12 Since my earlier publications, I have had the benefit of private communications with sitting Justices from the
left, right, and center—none still on the Court. These discussions gave me the impression that they would have liked to do
more to enforce the norm, but given the impediments, they
11. For the points summarized in this paragraph, see infra Parts III–IV.B.
12. This Article suggests a method of enforcement quite different than strict
enforcement of the norm after a period of transition. See SCHOENBROD, POWER
WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 5, at 170–91.
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were unsure of how to do so. This Article responds to such
concerns.
The Court’s recent disposition of Gundy v. United States13
suggests five Justices might be willing to revive judicial enforcement of the consent-of-the-governed norm.14 All Justices should
join in reviving the norm, especially now that the Presidency of
Donald Trump has made starkly evident what was true before:
legislators have long shirked their constitutional duty to take
responsibility for the exercise of legislative powers and the result
is often harm to their constituents. The Court’s failure to enforce
the norm has resulted in Congress and Presidents under both
parties devising and imposing new ways of delegating power
that allow incumbents to take credit for popular promises yet
shift blame for unpopular consequences.15 By so doing, the incumbents avoid the hard choices needed to deliver more effective
regulatory protection and reduce pointless regulatory burdens.16
Examples with deadly consequences for the governed are discussed in Part III.D. Such disgraceful legislative behavior,
made possible by the Court’s failure to enforce the norm, has
contributed to loss of trust in government.17 Trust in the federal
government to do “the right thing” most of time fell from

13. 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).
14. The dissent by Justice Gorsuch, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas, calls for reinvigorating the norm. Id. at 2135 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Justice Alito stated in his concurring opinion that, “If a majority of this Court were
willing to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would
support the effort.” Id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Kavanaugh did not participate in the decision. Later, Justice Kavanaugh wrote an
opinion in which he stated that Justice Gorsuch’s “scholarly analysis of the
Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine in his Gundy dissent may warrant further
consideration in future cases.” Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). For discussions of the likelihood that Gundy would lead to the enforcement of the norm, see Nicholas Bagley,
Opinion, ‘Most of Government is Unconstitutional’, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/opinion/sunday/gundy-united-states.html
[https://nyti.ms/2Y7UsXg]; David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Opinion, Alito Teases a
Judicial Revolution, WALL ST. J. (June 23, 2019, 3:10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
alito-teases-a-judicial-revolution-11561317002 [https://perma.cc/K8HZ-EPP7].
15. DAVID SCHOENBROD, DC C ONFIDENTIAL: INSIDE THE FIVE TRICKS OF
WASHINGTON 39–53, 70–74 (2017).
16. Id.
17. See Howard Dean & David Schoenbrod, Populism is powerful because Washington
deserves a kick in the pants, USA TODAY (Oct. 23, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://usat.ly/
2zwIRnL [https://perma.cc/N2X6-RZC7].
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three-quarters of voters in 1964 to one-third in 1980 and only
one-fifth in 2015, and one-sixth in 2019.18
Part I of this Article explains the original concept of the consentof-the-governed norm. Part II discusses the evolving impediments to judicial enforcement of the norm. Part III shows that
members of Congress should comply with the norm to a substantial extent, and their failure to do so causes grievous harm
to their constituents. Part IV shows how the Court could and
should substantially achieve the purpose of the norm. Part V
argues that the many rationales for ignoring the norm are flimsy.
I.

THE CONSENT-OF-THE-GOVERNED NORM
A.

The Norm’s Provenance

To require the consent of the governed, the Constitution empowered voters to sack the key policy makers. Article I vests
“All legislative Powers herein granted,” including making regulatory law, in a Congress, including a House of Representatives
directly elected at two year intervals, legislating in tandem
with a President.19 To make members of Congress personally
responsible, Article I requires how they vote—”the Yeas and
Nays”—be published when requested by one-fifth of the legislators present.20 So, these directly or indirectly elected officials
would be accountable for the hard legislative choices.21 Such
accountability would enable the governed to withhold their
consent in response to the decisions of elected officials.22 That
was the deal that the Framers offered the people.
Members of Congress would bear personal responsibility
even though voters may pay little attention until a vote for or
18. Public Trust in Government: 1958–2019, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 11, 2019), https://
www.people-press.org/2019/04/11/public-trust-in-government-1958-2019/ [https://
perma.cc/2BV8-NDPM].
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 2, 7–8.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 cl. 3 (“Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings . . . and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question
shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.”).
21. The Constitution does not, of course, call for the President to be popularly
elected, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2–3, and did not do so for senators until the
ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. Nonetheless,
even without direct elections, popular sentiment could result in either Presidents or
senators failing to get reelected.
22. THE FEDERALIST NO. 50, supra note 4, at 314–17 (James Madison).
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against a rule directly affects them. As Justice Kagan, quoting
James Madison, wrote in a powerful dissent from the Court’s
refusal to take on political gerrymandering:
To retain an “intimate sympathy with the people,” [members of Congress] must be “compelled to anticipate the moment” when their “exercise of [power] is to be reviewed.”
Election day—next year, and two years later, and two years
after that—is what links the people to their representatives,
and gives the people their sovereign power. That day is the
foundation of democratic governance.23

Debate at the Constitutional Convention proceeded on the
premise that Congress had to make the law itself rather than
delegate that job to others.24 John Locke, who influenced many
of the Framers, thought a people’s grant of legislative power
was “only to make laws, and not to make legislators” because
“when the people have said, [w]e will submit to rules, and be
governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms, no
body else can say other men shall make laws for them.”25
Making the regulatory law meant not just passing statutes
but passing statutes that state the rules of private conduct.26 In
Federalist No. 75, Alexander Hamilton wrote “The essence of the
legislative authority is to enact laws, or, in other words, to prescribe rules for the regulation of the society . . . .”27 In Fletcher v.
Peck,28 decided in 1810, the Supreme Court wrote, “It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the
government of society; the application of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of other departments.”29

23. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2512 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted) (second alteration in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NOS. 52,
57, at 124, 155 (James Madison) (J. & A. McLean eds., 1788)).
24. JOHN L. FITZGERALD, CONGRESS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 35–39
(1986); see generally JOSEPH POSTELL, BUREAUCRACY IN AMERICA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE’S CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT (2017).
25. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 87 (Richard H. Cox ed.,
Harlan Davidson, Inc. 1982) (1690).
26. For an argument to the contrary, see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1733 (2002). Part V.A
addresses their argument.
27. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 4, at 449 (Alexander Hamilton).
28. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
29. Id. at 136; see also, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2138 (2019)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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And in Gibbons v. Ogden,30 decided in 1824, the Court wrote
that the power to regulate commerce, which Article I includes
in the legislative power, is “to prescribe the rule by which
commerce is to be governed.”31 It is no wonder then that school
civics courses once taught that it is Congress’s job to make the
laws and that its members are called “lawmakers.”
In Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States,32 decided in 1813,
the Court recognized in dicta that Congress may not delegate
the power to make the rules of private conduct.33 The statute in
question conditioned a rule imposing a maritime embargo on
the President’s findings on whether other nations respected
American neutrality.34 Based upon the President’s findings, the
embargo took effect.35 The attorney for the party charged with
violating the embargo argued, “Congress could not transfer the
legislative power to the President. To make the revival of a law
depend upon the President’s proclamation, is to give to that
proclamation the force of a law.”36 The Court responded that
the President was not making a rule but rather applying a legislated rule by determining “the occurrence of any subsequent
combination of events.”37 This was not rulemaking but rather,
as Fletcher put it, “the application of [legislated] rules.”38 The
Court thus suggested that Congress could not delegate the
power to make rules of private conduct to the executive
branch.

30. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
31. Id. at 196.
32. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813).
33. Id. at 388.
34. Id. at 382–83.
35. Id. at 382.
36. Id. at 386.
37. Id. at 388. The passage in full is:
[W]e can see no sufficient reason, why the legislature should not exercise
its discretion in reviving the act of March 1st, 1809, either expressly or
conditionally, as their judgment should direct. The 19th section of that act
declaring that it should continue in force to a certain time, and no longer,
could not restrict their power of extending its operation, without
limitation upon the occurrence of any subsequent combination of events.
Id.
38. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810).
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What the Original Norm Would Require of Congress

To discharge its responsibility to make the rules of private
conduct as the norm originally required, Congress must itself
state the rules binding society in understandable terms, such as
a rule limiting pollution from designated factories. The rules
must be understandable so that voters can hold their representatives responsible in future elections. Understandability is
thus essential to serve the bedrock purpose of Article I.
In contrast, a statute like the modern Clean Air Act that tells
an agency to make rules to achieve some goal like “protect the
public health” with “an adequate margin of safety” states a
goal rather than a rule.39 Stating goals is insufficient because
Congress can state goals yet avoid responsibility to the governed for how the agency resolves major political controversies
in drafting the rule. As such, allowing Congress to do no more
than state goals conflicts with the original consent-of-thegoverned norm. For example, “protect the public health” is a
pleasing goal yet, when this language was inserted in the statute
in 1970,40 the statute’s chief author, Senator Edmund Muskie,
knew that the agency could not fully achieve the goal. As he
later admitted after the air pollution problem was safely in the
lap of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA):
Our public health scientists and doctors have told us that
there is no threshold, that any air pollution is harmful. The
Clean Air Act is based on the assumption, although we
knew at the time it was inaccurate, that there is a threshold.
When we set the standards [the responsibility for whose setting
Congress in fact left to the EPA], we understood that below
the standards that we set there would still be health effects.41

Yet, Congress took credit for unconditionally protecting
health.42 Nor did Congress decide, in the overwhelming majority
of cases, how to allocate the cleanup burden among the sources
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012).
40. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 109(b)(1), 84 Stat. 1676,
1680.
41. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Envtl.
Pollution of the Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works, pt. 3, 95th Cong. 8 (1977) (statement
of Sen. Edmund Muskie).
42. See, e.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON:
HOW CONGRESS GRABS POWER, SHIRKS RESPONSIBILITY, AND SHORTCHANGES THE
PEOPLE 70–72 (2005).
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that contribute to unhealthy pollution.43 So, the legislators had
plausible deniability for almost any unpopular consequences of
the rules announced on agency letterhead.
A statute that takes the form of a rule but in fact fails to state
a rule of conduct in understandable terms, such as one that
bars large factories from emitting “unreasonable” pollution,
violates the original consent-of-the-governed norm. What was
unreasonable was understandable when early courts instructed
juries in tort actions that the standard of reasonable care was
how people in their community customarily behaved, but it
would not be understandable when applied to a modern factory.44
Custom is no guide to the meaning of “unreasonable” when we
confront newly understood threats and learn of newly invented
means to deal with them. Such a statute fails to achieve the objective of Article I: to make the elected lawmakers responsible
for the politically salient choices.
Of course, even a forthright rule will require interpretation in
some cases.45 Yet, interpreting the law is distinct from policymaking.46 Interpretation calls for an inquiry into how the enacting legislature would have clarified the law’s ambiguities; policymaking calls for an inquiry into what makes sense to the
policymaker. In deciding how the Congress that passed the
statute would have resolved an ambiguity, a judge can get
information from many sources. One such source is that, by
dictating clear outcomes in most cases, the rule usually reveals
the relative weight the legislature gave to conflicting policy

43. Id. at 26. The singular exception is that the 1970 statute did require auto
manufacturers to reduce emissions from new cars by 90 percent. Clean Air
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1676, 1690. The 1970 statute called for the EPA and the states to regulate other sources, but in sufficiently
general terms that members of Congress could deny responsibility for the specific
emission limits imposed. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2012) (requiring the EPA
Administrator to regulate new stationary sources).
44. See, e.g., Aldred’s Case (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 820–21; 9 Co. Rep. 57 b, 58 b;
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 87–88 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
Little, Brown & Co. 1963) (1881).
45. See Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Law a System of Rules?, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 25, 52 (Robert S. Summers ed., 1968); see also HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 156 (tent. ed. 1958).
46. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1058–60 (1975).
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goals, such as enhancing regulatory protection versus avoiding
regulatory burdens.47
The original consent-of-the-governed norm is thus based upon
legal principles that courts routinely apply. The harder question is how courts should deal with modern impediments to
the original norm’s full enforcement.
II.

THE IMPEDIMENTS TO JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE
ORIGINAL NORM
A.

The Impediments’ Evolution

Wayman v. Southard48 decided by the Supreme Court in 1825
exemplifies the difficulty Congress encountered in legislating
all the rules of private conduct.49 The statute at issue instructed
the various federal district courts to adopt rules of procedure
that track state court procedural rules, but authorized the federal courts to make “alterations and additions.”50 It would have
been arduous for Congress to go through the procedural rules
of each state court system and adapt them to the needs of the
federal court. The Supreme Court saw no difficulty in allowing
the federal courts to adopt the rules regulating the courts rather
than private persons:
It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the
Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly
and exclusively legislative. But Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully
exercise itself. . . . [Either the courts or Congress,] for example, may make rules, directing the returning of writs and
processes, the filing of declarations and other pleadings, and
other things of the same description.51

47. Congress could call upon an agency to interpret a rule stated in a statute. For
example, a statute might require that, starting five years hence, no fossil-fueled
power plant may emit sulfur at more than half the current average emission rate
for such plants and direct the agency to issue a binding regulation stating the
future limit in numerical terms. The agency would need to interpret and apply the
statute, but Congress would have faced the salient policy choices. A court could
then review the agency’s interpretation. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2018). The agency
would be applying a rule rather than making it.
48. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 31.
51. Id. at 42–43.
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The complaint in the case, however, objected to rules that
governed private persons—in particular, a rule on the enforcement of judgments.52 The Court went on to state:
The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those
important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the
legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who
are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details.53

So, the opinion continued, other officials could “vary minor
regulations, which are within the great outlines marked out by
the legislature in directing the execution.”54 “Fill up the details”
in this context could be understood to be a test to accommodate
the inability of Congress to state every last rule—”minor” as
well as major—as required by the state-the-rule definition of
the norm articulated in Fletcher v. Peck, Brig Aurora, and Gibbons
v. Ogden.55
Congress’s difficulty in complying with the original norm
compounded as the need for new federal rules grew with the
growth in the nation’s land area, population, technological
prowess, and interstate activity. Take, for example, a problem
that came from railroad lines stretching across many states.
State-by-state ratemaking and litigation were no way to regulate an interstate railroad. Yet, Congress itself could not set the
rates for all the railroads. So, a wide range of interests including
the railroads themselves urged Congress to establish an agency
to deal with rates.56 The result was the Interstate Commerce Act
of 188757 establishing the Interstate Commerce Commission.58
52. Id. at 11.
53. Id. at 43.
54. Id. at 45.
55. “Fill up the details” might also be a somewhat different statement of the
norm. Rather than pausing to analyze which version is better or trying to reconcile
them, this Article will use the state-the-rule version. The reason is that Congress
now comes nowhere close to complying with either version, as the earlier discussion of the Clean Air Act illustrates, and the point of this Article is to show how
the Court could begin to bring Congress much closer to the consent-of-thegoverned norm rather than to define it exactly.
56. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION
OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877–1920, at 126–31 (1982).
57. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. (2012)).
58. Id. at 383.
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This statute was an early example of a new way of thinking about regulation. The new way was brought on by the
Progressive Movement, quite different from what “progressive” means today. As Professor Robert Wiebe’s excellent
history of the rise and decline of self-rule in the United States
explains, the end of the nineteenth century brought exciting
new technologies, as well as firms doing business on a national
scale, such as the railroads.59 In addition to their national outlook, the firms’ executives prided themselves on the quasiscientific systems they developed to operate on a national
scale.60 They hired junior executives from universities that instilled such pride in their students.61 Professor Wiebe calls the
group with this outlook the “national class” as distinguished
from the “local middle class,” which comprised the leading
lights of the older, more parochial order.62 The Ivy League rather than Podunk College was the path to success among the
national class.63 According to Professor Wiebe, the national
class sought to shift power from the state and local level to the
national and from legislatures beholden to voters to commissions and courts insulated from political pressure and staffed
by experts—in other words, to people more like themselves.64
In empowering federal agencies, the Progressives began to
push the republic down a slippery slope towards Congress systematically evading responsibility, but evasion was not the
common objective. To the contrary, many of the Progressives
believed in separation of powers, including a Congress that
makes the law, and thought they were honoring these beliefs.65
For example, they conceived of the Interstate Commerce Act as
authorizing experts to apply a legislated rule on railroad rates
rather than to make rules. Whether the standards in various
statutes left so much wiggle room as to constitute delegations of
legislative power was not apparent to many of the Progressives
because they saw their statutes as empowering experts in agen59. ROBERT H.
RACY 141 (1995).

WIEBE, SELF-RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN DEMOC-

60. See id. at 143.
61. See id. at 142–43.
62. Id. at 145.
63. See id. at 142–43.
64. Id. at 141–46.
65. See, e.g., SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 25, 86, 89, 449 (New York & Albany, Banks & Bros. 1891).
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cies insulated from politics to use scientific methods to find
correct ways to apply statutes.66 The Court rebuffed assertions
that the Progressives’ statutes empowering agencies violated
the consent-of-the-governed norm.67
Whether the Supreme Court failed to notice violations of the
norm in cases concerning delegations to expert agencies or decided that they should not enforce it in such cases, the Court
did enforce it in other sorts of cases. In United States v. L. Cohen
Grocery Co.,68 decided in 1921, the Court struck down a federal
statute on the grounds that it delegated lawmaking power to
the courts.69 The statute made it a crime to charge “unjust or
unreasonable” prices for “any necessaries.”70 With a delegation
to the courts rather than experts, there could be no pretense
science had made the indefinite definite. The Supreme Court
held, “Congress alone has power to define crimes against the
United States.”71
Similarly, in two other cases—Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,72
decided in 1920, and Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co.,73 decided
in 1924—the Court struck down statutes that instructed federal
courts to apply state workman’s compensation statutes in admiralty cases.74 The Justices reasoned that Congress could not
delegate to state legislatures the power to enact the federal law.
The Court first used the “intelligible principle” language in
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States75 decided in 1928, stating, “If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligi66. See WIEBE, supra note 59, at 175–76.
67. See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 681–94 (1892).
68. 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
69. Id. at 91–93.
70. Id. at 86.
71. Id. at 87–88 (quoting United States v. L. Cohen Grocer Co. 264 F. 218, 220
(E.D. Mo. 1920)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Delegation of the power to
make rules of private conduct may be particularly concerning when they are
backed by criminal sanctions, but many statutes that authorize agencies to make
rules of private conduct give these agencies the option of enforcing them criminally.
See JOHN G. MALCOLM, CRIMINAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: THE
PROBLEM WITH CRIMINAL REGULATIONS 1–2 (Heritage Found., Legal Memorandum No. 130, 2014), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/LM130.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H5NR-L7XK].
72. 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
73. 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
74. Id. at 227–28; Knickerbocker, 253 U.S. at 166.
75. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
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ble principle to which the person or body authorized to fix
such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a
forbidden delegation of legislative power.”76 Justice Gorsuch’s
dissent in Gundy v. United States, argues that:
No one at the time thought the phrase [“intelligible principle”] meant to effect some revolution in this Court’s understanding of the Constitution. While the exact line between
policy and details, lawmaking and factfinding, and legislative
and nonlegislative functions had sometimes invited reasonable
debate, everyone agreed these were the relevant inquiries.
And when Chief Justice Taft wrote of an “intelligible principle,” it seems plain enough that he sought only to explain
the operation of these traditional tests; he gave no hint of a
wish to overrule or revise them . . . . There’s a good argument, as well, that the statute in J. W. Hampton passed muster under the traditional tests.77

Whether J.W. Hampton applied an “intelligible principle” test,
it did state, “In determining what [Congress] may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent and character of
that assistance must be fixed according to common sense and
the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination.”78
Such fixing sounds like a policy decision better left to the political branches. An editorial in The Constitutional Review said that
the statute upheld was “the most dangerous advance in bureaucratic government ever attempted in America.”79
Nonetheless, Justice Gorsuch’s contention that the “intelligible principle” language was not meant to weaken the test of
delegation is buttressed by the Court’s response to the National
Industrial Recovery Act80 passed only five years later. The statute
granted the President sweeping powers to regulate industry in
response to the Great Depression but did little to control how
he used those powers.81 The Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini
stated admiringly of President Franklin Roosevelt’s sway under the statute, “Ecco un dittatore!”—that is, “Behold a dicta-

76. Id. at 409 (internal quotations omitted).
77. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2139 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
78. J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 406.
79. J.S. Cotton, The General Welfare Clause, 13 CONST. REV. 98, 101 (1929).
80. Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
81. Id.
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tor!”82 In 1935, in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,83 a divided Court
struck one delegation in the statute.84 Later that year, in A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,85 a unanimous Court,
including Justices Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone, struck another
of its delegations.86 Then, in 1936, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,87
citing Schechter, the Court struck down a delegation of rulemaking power to an association of coal mining companies.88
Thus, the Court struck down three delegations for violating the
consent-of-the-governed norm in the seven years after J.W.
Hampton.
After winning reelection in 1936, President Roosevelt famously struck back at the Court, which had defied him on delegation and other issues, by proposing a statute authorizing
him to appoint additional Justices.89 Congress did not pass this
court-packing plan,90 but the President nonetheless prevailed.
One of the Court’s changes of position was derisively labeled
the “switch in time that saved nine,” suggesting that change
was to protect the Court.91 Yet, the evidence shows that the
change came before the President announced his plan and was
made public only afterwards.92 Nonetheless, the Justices did
seek to insulate the Court from political turmoil.93 The judicial
82. James Q. Whitman, Of Corporatism, Fascism, and the First New Deal, 39 AM. J.
COMP. L. 747, 766 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“dittatore” misspelled in original).
83. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
84. Id. at, 419–33.
85. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
86. Id. at 529–42.
87. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
88. Id. at 310–12 (citing Schechter, 295 U.S. at 537).
89. See JAMES F. SIMON, FDR AND CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES 312–15 (2012).
90. Id. at 333–34.
91. Id. at 327.
92. See id. The “switch” refers to the Justice Owen Roberts voting to strike a state
minimum wage statute in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936),
but then taking a contrary position in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937).
93. Chief Justice Hughes worked to frame decisions to minimize the likelihood
of the Court’s independence being crimped. See SIMON, supra note 89, at 299–300,
302–06, 323–29, 332, 335–37, 392. For another example, Justice Frankfurter wrote in
a concurrence in a decision not to take on malapportionment of legislative districts, “It is hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of
the people. And it is not less pernicious if such judicial intervention in an essentially political contest be dressed up in the abstract phrases of the law.” Colegrove
v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553–54 (1946) (plurality opinion). For a discussion of im-
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unmanageability of the intelligible principle test, of course, let
the Court sidestep the potentially troublesome issue of delegation.
With retiring Justices replaced by President Roosevelt appointees and the nation facing the emergencies of the Great
Depression and World War II, the Court rejected every constitutional challenge to regulatory statutes on consent-of-thegoverned grounds.94 Whatever the Court originally meant by
“intelligible principle,” it came to mean next to nothing. As Justice
Kagan stated in her opinion for the Court in Gundy v. United
States, “we have over and over upheld even very broad delegations” including “to regulate in the ‘public interest.’”95
Professor Bruce Ackerman argues the confrontation between
President Roosevelt and the Court, President Roosevelt’s subsequent reelections by overwhelming margins, and the Court’s
subsequent rulings constituted a “constitutional moment” that
amended the Constitution to, among other things, allow delegation of legislative power.96 I dispute this argument in Part
V.D. Nonetheless, as Part IV.A shows, sufficiently strong
public opinion can, as long as it persists, keep the Court from
fully enforcing constitutional norms despite the hope that the
Constitution is a counter-majoritarian imperative.
Whatever strong public opinion in favor of delegation there
was no longer persists. According to Professor David Mayhew,
in polls conducted in 1958, 1977, and 2004 to 2005, by a margin
of three to one, voters prefer Congress rather than the President
to “make policies.”97 A poll taken in January 2019 found that
“[e]ighty-two percent (82%) of voters believe Congress should
review and approve regulations rather than allowing agencies
to set them up on their own.”98 In this poll, the support for
pediments to full enforcement of constitutional norms, including “politics,” see
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FIDELITY & CONSTRAINT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS READ
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 163–68 (2019).
94. Whitman v. American Trucking, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (citing cases).
95. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129 (2019) (citing Nat’l Broad. Co.
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943); N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States,
287 U.S. 12, 24 (1932)).
96. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 306–11 (1991); Bruce A.
Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering The Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013,
1053–57, 1070–71 (1984).
97. DAVID R. MAYHEW, THE IMPRINT OF CONGRESS 8 (2017).
98. Scott Rasmussen, 82% Say Congress Should Review & Approve Federal Regulations,
SCOTTRASMUSSEN.COM (Jan. 24, 2019), https://scottrasmussen.com/82-say-congressshould-review-approve-federal-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/W7GD-EVXU]; see also
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Congress to shoulder responsibility was much the same regardless of party affiliation, race, or political ideology.99
One manifestation of public opinion against congressional
buck passing came along with the first Earth Day in 1970. A
book documenting a study funded by Ralph Nader had
charged that people died from air pollution because Congress,
starting with Senator Muskie, had written ineffective air pollution legislation that gave an agency broad discretion to regulate
pollution and thereby avoided the hard choices.100 In response,
Senator Muskie authored the 1970 Clean Air Act, which he asserted “faces the air pollution crisis with urgency and in candor. It makes hard choices . . . .”101 As a result, he vowed, “all
Americans in all parts of the country shall have clean air to
breathe within the 1970’s.”102 Instead of openly granting an
agency broad discretion on how to regulate, the new statute
supposedly ordered the EPA to make rules fully sufficient to
protect health by deadlines and granted citizens the right to
enforce this order in federal court.103 The statute did not deliver
what Senator Muskie maintained it did. It left almost all the
hard choices to the agency, as Part III.D will show. Congress’s
need to pretend otherwise evidences public opinion against
Congress passing the buck.
When the dust settled from the emergencies of the Great
Depression, World War II, and the Korean War, Justices expressed concern for the consent-of-the-governed norm. In Kent
v. Dulles104 decided in 1958, five Justices invoked it as a reason
to narrowly construe a statute that otherwise threatened protected freedoms, and in so doing, the Court limited the authority
Mark Chenoweth, Florida Voters Join Chevron Revolt And Strike A Blow Against Judicial Bias, FORBES (Nov. 8, 2018, 8:44 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
markchenoweth/2018/11/08/florida-voters-join-chevron-revolt-and-strike-a-blowagainst-judicial-bias/#2cfd60f44fe6 [https://perma.cc/F7CY-TJNU] (Florida passes
referendum abolishing Chevron-like statutory interpretation in state courts).
99. PJ Rasmussen, Crosstabs Jan. 15–16, SCOTTRASMUSSEN.COM (Jan. 16, 2019),
https://scottrasmussen.com/crosstabs-jan-15-16-3 [https://perma.cc/CL8A-QNDJ].
100. See Ralph Nader, Foreword to JOHN C. ESPOSITO & LARRY J. SILVERMAN,
VANISHING AIR: THE RALPH NADER STUDY GROUP REPORT ON AIR POLLUTION, at
vii–ix, 287 (1970).
101. 116 CONG. REC. 42,381 (1970).
102. Id.
103. See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, §§ 108(a), 109(a)(1),
110(f)(2)(b), 84 Stat. 1676, 1678–79, 1683.
104. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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the statute conferred to the executive branch.105 Then, in National
Cable Television Ass’n v. United States,106 decided in 1974, the
Court invoked the norm to reject an interpretation of a statute
that gave an agency the power to tax those it regulated to cover
the cost of regulation.107 This was the first time the consent-ofthe-governed norm had been applied in a case regarding regulatory control of business in four decades. The Justices citing
the norm in these cases and others were from both sides of the
political spectrum.
The norm also played a role in the Supreme Court’s handling
of a challenge to the Occupational Safety and Health Act.108 It,
like the Clean Air Act, was passed in 1970 and made highsounding promises. It directed the agency to ensure “safe . . .
places of employment” and reduce occupational exposure to
toxic materials “to the extent feasible,” without making clear
what these requirements meant.109 In its decision in Industrial
Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute (often
called the Benzene case),110 the Court held invalid a regulation
that the agency promulgated to limit benzene levels in workplaces.111 Arguing that the statute might otherwise be an unconstitutionally broad delegation, three Justices construed the
statute to require the agency to base the limit on harms the
agency determined are significant.112 The agency had failed to
require that the harm be significant. A fifth Justice, then-Justice
Rehnquist, voted to declare the Act unconstitutional for dele-

105. Id. at 129 (“Where activities . . . often necessary to the well-being of an
American citizen, such as travel, are involved, we will construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them.”). In Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546
(1963), three Justices dissented on the grounds that the Court should have invoked the norm to construe a statute narrowly. Id. at 625–27 (Harlan, J., dissenting
in part).
106. 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
107. Id. at 342–43.
108. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–
678 (2012)).
109. Id. §§ 3(8), 6(b)(5) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(8), 655(b)(5) (2012)).
110. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
111. Id. at 661–62 (plurality opinion).
112. Id.
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gating legislative power,113 a position with which Chief Justice
Burger agreed in a later case.114
In 1996, in Loving v. United States,115 the Court praised the
consent-of-the-governed norm in dicta.116 A soldier sentenced
to death invoked the norm to challenge the constitutionality of
a statute that empowered the President to establish the criteria
for such sentences in military tribunals.117 He lost, in part because of the special authority that the President has in military
matters, but the Court stated:
Article I’s precise rules of representation, member qualifications, bicameralism, and voting procedure make Congress
the branch most capable of responsive and deliberative
lawmaking. Ill suited to that task are the Presidency, designed for the prompt and faithful execution of the laws and
its own legitimate powers, and the Judiciary, a branch with
tenure and authority independent of direct electoral control.
The clear assignment of power to a branch, furthermore, allows the citizen to know who may be called to answer for
making, or not making, those delicate and necessary decisions essential to governance.118

Yet, the “clear assignment of power” does not result in the
Court enforcing the norm in most cases and, where the Court
does enforce the norm, it asserts that it is not invoking the
consent-of-the-governed norm. Take the case cited, INS v.
Chadha.119 It struck the legislative veto which, depending upon
the statute in which it appears, allowed one or two houses of
Congress to veto designated administrative actions.120 The stated
rationale was that the legislative veto cuts the President out of
legislative actions in contravention of the Article I legislative process, which involves the House, the Senate, and the President.121
Yet, as Justice Byron White argued in dissent, the legislative
veto was being struck because it delegates legislative power to
113. Id. at 671–88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
114. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543–44 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.).
115. 517 U.S. 748 (1996).
116. Id. at 757–58.
117. Id. at 751–52.
118. Id. at 757–58 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).
119. 462 U.S. 919.
120. Id. at 959–60.
121. See id. at 946–48.
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a process other than that of Article I,122 but that reasoning
would also invalidate delegation of lawmaking authority to
agencies.123 The Loving dicta did, however, hint that Chadha
could be viewed as, in part, a delegation case.
Similarly, in Clinton v. City of New York124 decided in 1998,
Justices from the left and right joined in striking down the lineitem veto, which allowed the President to reject line items in
appropriations statutes.125 The Court reasoned that this procedure contravened Article I’s legislative process, which limits
the President to accepting or not the entire bill passed by the
House and the Senate.126 Yet, the line-item veto could also be
conceived as delegating some of Congress’s power over appropriations to the President acting alone. Concerns of practicality were no barrier in striking a delegation of the appropriations power because Congress likes to hand out the money
itself. Spending, after all, usually brings credit to its members.
In contrast, Congress often delegates the power to impose rules
of private conduct because they bring blame as well as credit.
Thus, the Court faced a case fraught with more political and
practical difficulty in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns127
decided in 2001, in which trade associations had argued that a
popular regulatory statute, the Clean Air Act, unconstitutionally
delegated legislative power.128 Specifically, they argued the
“protect the public health” provision delegated legislative
power because it gave no guidance as to the extent to which the
agency must protect health.129 A D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
panel had held that the Clean Air Act as construed by the
agency did delegate power unconstitutionally.130
122. Id. at 984–89 (White, J., dissenting).
123. See id. at 985–87.
124. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
125. Id. at 417–20.
126. Id. at 436–41.
127. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
128. Id. at 458–59.
129. See id. at 463.
130. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (per curiam), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, and remanded sub nom. Whitman, 531 U.S. 457. The Wall Street Journal
reported that this aspect of the original court of appeals decision was influenced
by SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 5. John J. Fialka,
Professor Seeks to Limit Congress Ability to Delegate Tasks to Federal Agencies, WALL ST.
J. (May 20, 1999, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB927150035434840424
[https://perma.cc/2XLS-FN9Y]. The panel held, however, the statute might be

No. 1]

Consent of the Governed

235

In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court stated that the text
of the Constitution “permits no delegation of [legislative] powers.”131 Yet, having seemingly vowed that the Court would stop
Congress from abdicating its legislative power, the Court trivialized that vow by stating, “we repeatedly have said that when
Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies
Congress must ‘lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed
to conform.’”132 Indeed, the opinion, like Justice Kagan’s opinion for the Court in Gundy quoted earlier, noted that even goals
as mushy as “the public interest” had counted as an “intelligible principle.”133 The opinion concluded by stating that “we
have ‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be
left to those executing or applying the law.’”134 The quotation is
from an earlier opinion in which Justice Scalia argued that “intelligible principle” was not a judicially manageable test.135 In
effect, Whitman allows members of Congress to judge whether
they have made themselves sufficiently responsible to their
constituents, despite their self-interest in avoiding responsibility.136 In sum, when it comes to the rules of private conduct, the
consent-of-the-governed norm has become a farce.
saved through a narrowing interpretation, but rather than narrowing the interpretation itself, the court called upon the agency to consider a narrowing construction. See Am. Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034–38. The decision seemed to be Benzene
adapted to the age of Chevron. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Defense Council,
467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Court rejected having the agency provide a narrowing
interpretation: “The idea that an agency can cure an unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power by declining to exercise some of that power seems to us
internally contradictory. The very choice of which portion of the power to exercise—that is to say, the prescription of the standard that Congress had omitted—would itself be an exercise of the forbidden legislative authority.” Whitman,
531 U.S. at 473.
131. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472.
132. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
133. Id. at 474.
134. Id. at 474–75 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)) (citing Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 (majority opinion)).
135. Id. (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). This
passage was cited with approval in the Court’s opinion in Gundy v. United States.
139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130 (2019).
136. American Trucking could have won a minor victory for the constitutional norm
along the lines of Benzene by adopting the argument that Professor Marci Hamilton
and I advanced in an amicus brief. Brief of the Manufacturers Alliance/MAPI Inc. et
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The Impediments Today

Believing that Congress cannot fully comply with the consent-of-the-governed norm, the Court has concluded that it
cannot enforce the norm as originally understood.137 Many, if
not most, of the regulatory statutes in the United States Code
would fail to comply with the norm as originally understood.138
The Court, of course, purports to limit delegation through
the “intelligible principle” test, but it is judicially unmanageable and so no limit on delegation in practice. Justice Gorsuch’s
dissent in Gundy suggests important strides in the direction of
the Court overcoming this impediment to enforcing the norm.
His dissent calls for discarding the “intelligible principle” test,
which he calls a “misadventure,”139 and replacing it with a judicially manageable test. The dissent also recognizes that Chief
Justice Marshall’s 1825 opinion in Wayman v. Southard could
provide precedential support for such a test.140 Justice Gorsuch
writes that Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion “distinguished between those ‘important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself,’ and ‘those of less interest, in
which a general provision may be made, and power given to

al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Whitman, 531 U.S. 457 (No. 991257). We argued that to reduce the scope of the delegation, the statute should be
construed to require the agency to set the standard to protect against harms to
health that it found to be significant and in the rulemaking it had expressly refused to make such a finding. Id. at 15–20. There was strong support for this reading of the statute in its legislative history. Id. Seemingly driven by profits more
than constitutional principle, American Trucking preferred to argue that the statute be construed to minimize costs to its members. See David Schoenbrod, Politics
and the Principle That Elected Legislators Should Make the Laws, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 239, 270–75 (2003). Professor Hamilton and I filed amicus briefs on the delegation issue in Clinton, Loving, and other cases.
137. As stated in Mistretta v. United States, “[I]n our increasingly complex society,
replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot
do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.” 488
U.S. at 372.
138. See Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323,
327 (1987). Even if such a ruling were made prospective, Congress and agencies
would have to struggle to meet the need for ongoing changes in statutes and
regulations.
139. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
140. See id. at 2135–36 (citing Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43
(1825)). Justice Gorsuch omitted Chief Justice Marshall’s reference to “minor regulations.” Id.; Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 45.
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those who are to act . . . to fill up the details.’”141 The dissent
goes on to make a convincing case that the statutory provision
at issue in Gundy left far more than details to the delegate.142
Nonetheless, additional strides are needed before the test
discussed in the dissent would be a workable test for a majority.
If Justice Gorsuch had been writing for the Court, his use of the
statutory-invalidation guillotine would threaten huge swathes
of the United States Code and the Code of Federal Regulations.
His test would be a threat because it would be hard to know in
advance how the Court would draw the line between “important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself,” and “those of less interest, in which a general
provision may be made, and power given to those who are to
act . . . to fill up the details.”143 This formulation leaves many
questions open. Does the test mean that Congress must state
the more important rules, the more important goals, or some
combination thereof? Whichever it is, it would also be unclear
how to define the level of importance. Indeed, it would be
much more difficult to construct a judicially manageable test
along these lines in 2020 than it would have been in the simpler
world of 1825.
Even if the Court could construct a judicially manageable test
along the lines that Justice Gorsuch’s dissent suggests, doing so
would take many years of case-by-case adjudication. Meanwhile, federal regulators as well as businesses, state and local
governments, nonprofits, and others subject to federal regulation
have come to rely upon regulation as we now have it. More
agencies with more power have produced a Code of Federal
Regulations with twelve times more words than it had when
first codified in 1938.144 The reliance is massive.
During the years of uncertainty that Justice Gorsuch’s test
would produce, stakeholders would have to predict which
regulations would be found valid and which would not. The
uncertainty would plague both large organizations and smaller
organizations and individuals without ready access to legal
141. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (omission in original)
(quoting Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43).
142. See id. at 2143–48.
143. Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43.
144. Email from Ethan Clarkson, Research Assistant, N.Y. Law Sch., to author
(Oct. 10, 2019) (on file with author).
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advice. After all, individuals who farm, practice dentistry on
their own, or operate gas stations, to name just some examples,
are subject to many federal regulations. The approval process
for many projects, big and small, could take much longer than
it does now. On top of the uncertain status of old regulations
would come uncertainty in issuing new ones.145 All this uncertainty would harm the economy generally. Meanwhile, advocates for various regulatory causes would upset voters by saying that the Court had stripped them of essential regulatory
protection.146
To avert such a catastrophe, the Court would need to explain
to the governed and elected officials how to transition to what
most of the people want—regulatory protection that is both
workable and subject to the consent of the governed. I will
suggest how the Court could do so but first will discuss what
Congress should do on its own.
III.
A.

CONGRESS FLOUTS THE NORM
Congress’s Duty to Comply with the
Norm to the Extent Practical

Even if impediments prevent even partial judicial enforcement of the consent-of-the-governed norm, members of Congress
are honor bound to do their best to comply with it. As Dean
Lawrence Sager argues in an article on underenforced constitutional norms, “[C]onstitutional norms which are underenforced
by the federal judiciary should be understood to be legally valid
to their full conceptual limits, and federal judicial decisions
which stop short of these limits should be understood as delin-

145. However, Justice Gorsuch suggests, “Congress can also commission agencies or other experts to study and recommend legislative language.” Gundy, 139 S.
Ct. at 2145 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Yes, it might, but his optimism takes no account of the gridlock in Congress.
146. All the uncertainty and upset would arouse political antagonism against
the Court and so add to the current speculation about court packing. James Freeman,
Opinion, Justice Ginsburg Kicks Buttigieg, WALL ST. J. (July 25, 2019, 4:03 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/justice-ginsburg-kicks-buttigieg-11564084993 [https://perma.cc/
8NMJ-N7JM]. Indeed, four aspirants to the Democratic Party’s nomination for
President—Mayor Pete Buttigieg and Senators Kirsten Gillibrand, Kamala Harris,
and Elizabeth Warren—say they are open to court packing. Id.
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eating only the boundaries of the federal courts’ role in enforcing the norm . . . .”147
Dean Sager also calls for courts to distinguish norms from
the impediments to their full enforcement.148 He illustrates the
distinction with the “equal protection” norm,149 which he defines this way: “A state may treat people differently only when
it is fair to do so.”150 The impediment to its full enforcement is
that federal courts should not second guess policy decisions the
Constitution assigns to states.151 To accommodate this impediment, federal courts developed a test for judicial enforcement
that differs from the equal protection norm: an inequality is
permitted if it bears a “rational relationship” to the government’s justification for it, unless the inequality involves a dubious classification such as race.152 This test ends up crediting
some pretextual justifications, thus permitting some unfair
inequalities. Dean Sager shows that by recognizing that the
rational relationship test allows some violations of the equal
protection norm, federal courts can allow state courts and
Congress, which do not face the same impediment as do the
federal courts, to augment the federal courts’ incomplete enforcement.153 Thus, the norm and the test for its judicial enforcement differ. As Professor Thomas Nachbar writes, “There
is no textual basis in the Constitution to justify reviewing legislation for its rationality.”154

147. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1221 (1978). Dean Sager also states the
following:
This obligation to obey constitutional norms at their unenforced margins
requires governmental officials to fashion their own conceptions of these
norms and measure their conduct by reference to these conceptions.
Public officials cannot consider themselves free to act at what they
perceive or ought to perceive to be peril to constitutional norms merely
because the federal judiciary is unable to enforce these norms at their
margins.
Id. at 1227.
148. Id. at 1212.
149. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
150. Sager, supra note 147, at 1215, 1263–64 (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. See id. at 1216.
152. See id. at 1216–17.
153. See id. at 1212.
154. Thomas B. Nachbar, The Rationality of Rational Basis Review, 102 VA. L. REV.
1627, 1630 (2016).
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Dean Sager’s article does not discuss the underenforced
consent-of-the-governed norm.155 He did write, however, that a
norm’s status as underenforced is “particularly apparent when
the absence of ‘judicially manageable standards’ is cited as a
reason for the invocation of the political question doctrine.”156
This is a reason that the Court gives for underenforcing the
consent-of-the-governed norm.157
Because, as Dean Sager argues, underenforced norms are valid
to their full conceptual limits and the consent-of-the-governed
norm bars delegation of the power to make rules of private
conduct, Congress should do its best to take direct responsibility for such rules. Congress would aim too low if it sought to
provide no more than an insipid “intelligible principle.”
B.

Congress Could Comply with the
Norm to a Substantial Extent

Congress could do much more than it now does to comply
with the consent-of-the-governed norm. One way that Congress
could shoulder more of its constitutional responsibility while
still making use of agency expertise was suggested by James
Landis, once the New Deal’s leading expert on administrative
law and later dean of Harvard Law School. He suggested that
Congress could require new “administrative action . . . of large
significance” not take effect until Congress explicitly approves
it.158 He wrote that for administrative officials, “it was an act of

155. Whether the ultimate reason for underenforcement of a norm is an institutional constraint on the courts or on Congress, the consent of the governed should
be viewed as an underenforced constitutional norm. See Sager, supra note 147, at
1227. A search of law reviews found seven publications that both cited Dean
Sager’s article and mentioned the “delegation doctrine” or “nondelegation.”
Email from William Mills, Professor & Assoc. Librarian, N.Y. Law Sch., to author
(Nov. 30, 2018) (on file with author). None of these publications discussed the
possibility of using Dean Sager’s recommendations to improve enforcement of the
consent-of-the-governed norm. Id.
156. Sager, supra note 147, at 1226.
157. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001). The
reliance on the lack of a judicially manageable standard is clearer in the opinion
that the Court quotes there, Mistretta v. United States. 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
158. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 77, 79 (1938). Landis alternatively suggested the legislative veto, which was struck down in Chadha. Id. at 77.
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political wisdom to put back upon the shoulders of Congress”
responsibility for such actions.159
In 1984, Stephen Breyer, then a court of appeals judge,
showed how Congress could structure a statute to efficiently implement Dean Landis’s idea.160 The statute would force Congress
to vote on bills to approve agency actions.161 If approved by
both houses, the bill would be presented to the President for
signature, thus avoiding the objection that doomed the legislative veto in Chadha.162 The statute would set deadlines by which
the House and Senate must vote, limit debate, and bar filibusters
on such votes.163 Instead of using gridlock or statutes mouthing
platitudinous goals to avoid responsibility for hard choices, the
legislators would have to vote on specific regulations.
Then-Judge Breyer framed his proposal as a way for Congress
to reclaim the power that it lost when Chadha struck down the
legislative veto and so confined it to actions previously subject
to a legislative veto.164 To serve the purpose of the consent-ofthe-governed norm, it would be better to aim the proposal at
significant regulations. The proposal could target regulations
defined as “significant regulatory action” for the purpose of
review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in
the Office of Management and Budget.165 There would be about
as many such regulations as current votes on symbolic public
laws such as those naming post offices.166 President William
Clinton issued the executive order containing the current definition, and it has remained largely unchanged under Presidents
George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump.167 Voting

159. Id. at 76.
160. Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785, 793–96 (1984).
161. Id. at 794.
162. Id. at 793.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 793.
165. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641–42 (1994), reprinted as
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (2012). President Clinton’s executive order was in
turn a variation on one issued by President Reagan. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3
C.F.R. 127 (1982), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638.
166. SCHOENBROD, supra note 15, at 153.
167. See Exec. Order No. 13,789, § 2(a)(iii), 82 Fed. Reg. 19,317, 19,317 (Apr. 21,
2017) (same); Exec. Order No. 13,609, § 4(f), 3 C.F.R. 255, 257 (2013) (referencing
the definition in President Clinton’s executive order); Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3
C.F.R. 191 (2008) (implicitly using the same definition by not altering the original
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on significant regulations would require legislators to shoulder
more responsibility than voting on the names of post offices,
but the Constitution includes voting on regulatory rules in
Congress’s job description, not naming post offices.
Members of Congress could find the time for such work.
Starting with House Speaker Newt Gingrich in the late 1990s,
congressional leaders began to push their members to spend
most of their time back home in their districts to, in effect,
campaign for reelection, reserving only two to three days per
week in Washington and only in weeks when Congress is in
session. Moreover, even when in Washington, party leaders
push their members to spend far more time raising campaign
contributions (much of which are donated to the party leaders’
war chests) and campaigning for reelection rather than working on legislation.168 The upshot is that most “lawmakers”
spend much less time lawmaking than many weekend golfers
spend golfing.169 Were members of Congress responsible for
regulations, however, even party leaders would want them to
spend more time considering the regulations on which they
would cast votes. In voting on regulations, members of Congress
and their staffs would have the benefit of the agency’s rulemaking record.
There will, of course, sometimes be major fights over regulations in Congress, but that is where the fighting is supposed to
be. Congress passing the buck does not stop the fights but rather
displaces them to other venues, such as hearings over the confirmation of judicial nominees.170
The statute implementing the Landis-Breyer proposal should
make clear that a bill on a regulation would approve the agency’s
promulgation of it rather than enact it.171 That way, the regulation once approved would still be subject to judicial review,
definition), revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2010), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 note (2012).
168. SCHOENBROD, supra note 15, at 89–90.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., Press Release, Senator Ben Sasse, Sasse on Kavanaugh Hearing:
“We Can And We Should Do Better Than This” (Sept. 4, 2018), https://
www.sasse.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/9/sasse-on-kavanaugh-hearing-wecan-and-we-should-do-better-than-this [https://perma.cc/C9Z9-56SN].
171. See David Schoenbrod, Responsibility for Regulation Act, DC-CONFIDENTIAL.ORG
(2019), https://www.dc-confidential.org/responsibility-regulation-act/ [https://
perma.cc/D9WB-WSFN] (outlining such a bill).
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especially on whether the agency acted within its statutory authority.172 Moreover, the agency could amend the regulation on
its own if the amendment is not so important as to constitute
“significant regulatory action.”
It may seem strange that a regulation reviewed by both
houses of Congress and the President could be reviewed again
by a court or amended by an agency. Recall, however, that the
legislative process has approved the agency’s promulgation of
the regulation rather than enacted the regulation. Surely,
Congress can approve the promulgation of a single, known
regulation when it now has on the books statutes that approve
in advance and wholesale the promulgation of future, and thus
unknown, regulations. The former, by making Congress accountable, complies with the consent-of-the-governed norm.
Moreover, Congress is within its power to approve an action
for one purpose but leave it to the courts to decide its legality
for other purposes. For example, in Tennessee Valley Authority
v. Hill,173 the Supreme Court rejected the Tennessee Valley
Authority’s argument that Congress’s appropriation of money
to build the Tellico Dam insulated the project from objection
under the Endangered Species Act.174
Judicial review is desirable because otherwise an agency
could increase its own statutory authority by gaining congressional approval of a regulation exceeding its previous authority
under the enabling statute. Such increase of authority would
shift the initiative in increasing agency authority from Congress
to agencies. Moreover, growing the agencies’ authority implicitly
by Congress approving a regulation would create uncertainty as
to the scope of agencies’ authority in issuing later regulations.175
For a final wrinkle, the statute might approve the promulgation of all earlier regulations. Such wholesale approval would
172. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2018).
173. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
174. See id. at 172–73, 189–90. In this case, the Court used tools of statutory construction to find that Congress did not intend to insulate the dam from scrutiny
under the Endangered Species Act. See id. at 188. The statute implementing the
Landis-Breyer proposal could make the courts’ work easier by stating explicitly
that judicial review would be preserved. No Justice in TVA v. Hill opined that
Congress could not decide one issue (appropriation) and leave another issue unresolved (whether building the dam violated the Endangered Species Act).
175. For more on the desirability of preserving judicial review, see Schoenbrod,
supra note 171.
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not do much to make members of Congress accountable for
any old regulation but would acknowledge Congress’s failure
to do its duty for many decades and so be an initial step toward atonement. The wholesale approval would also shield the
old regulations from challenge on consent-of-the-governed
grounds and thereby greatly reduce the uncertainty and upset
that would arise if the Court began to enforce this norm as to
significant regulations.
C.

How Flouting the Norm Benefits Legislators Politically

Let us call the resulting statute the Responsibility for Regulation
Act. Congress has failed to adopt a statute forcing it to comply
substantially with the consent-of-the-governed norm because
the legislators do not want the responsibility. Consider what
happened after some members asked me in 1995 to help design
a bill that would increase Congress’s responsibility for regulations. I suggested the Landis-Breyer proposal. The result was a
bill that members of both parties introduced called the Congressional Responsibility Act.176
When the bill began to get support, the growing possibility
of its passage worried party leaders because legislators would
end up with responsibility for hard choices. To avoid responsibility while assuaging popular opinion calling for it, Congress
passed in 1996 a sound-alike bill, the Congressional Review
Act, and President Clinton signed it.177 It gives Congress the
option of voting on regulations, but not surprisingly the legislators hardly ever opt to take that responsibility. All but one of
the exceptions came after the Obama Administration postponed
controversial regulations until after the 2016 election to avoid
angering voters before they went to the polls and, assumedly,
elected Hillary Clinton.178 As a result, the Obama Administration
failed to give Congress notice of many regulations in time to
safeguard them from annulment by the Republican President
176. Congressional Responsibility Act of 1995, H.R. 2727, 104th Cong. This bill,
unlike my present proposal, was not limited to significant regulations.
177. Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2018).
178. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reawakening the Congressional Review Act, 41 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 187, 190–91, 243–44 (2018); Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional
Review Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2162, 2162 (2009) (describing the Bush Administration’s
use of the Congressional Review Act to overturn the Clinton Administration’s
ergonomics rule).
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and Congress that took over in 2017.179 Yet, the leaders of the
Republican majorities in Congress allowed votes on only that
small portion of these vulnerable regulations that would not
require their members to make hard choices.180
Long before 2017, however, it became apparent that the
Congressional Review Act failed to make elected lawmakers responsible to voters. To ward off blame for failing to take responsibility for regulations, Republicans in the House have repeatedly
passed a bill based in part upon the original Congressional
Responsibility Act.181 Unfortunately, the new bill is another
sham, starting with its new title, Regulations from the Executive
in Need of Scrutiny (REINS). The title suggests that the regulations stem from overzealous agencies despite the many statutes
requiring agencies to promulgate regulations. Worse still, the
bill is full of poison pills that ensure it will never get significant
Democratic support, thus making its enactment improbable.182
Indeed, of the thirty-nine cosponsors of the bill in the Senate in
the 115th Congress, none was a Democrat.183 The upshot is that

179. See Juliet Eilperin & Darla Cameron, How Trump is rolling back Obama’s legacy,
WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/
trump-rolling-back-obama-rules/?utm_term=.c0ae88396f22 [https://perma.cc/R6V5FYE6].
180. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, McConnell Promised to End Senate Gridlock. Instead,
Republicans Are Stuck in Neutral., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/08/03/us/politics/senate-votes-mcconnell.html [https://nyti.ms/2OTvScz] (noting the Republican-led Senate had the fewest legislative debates in recent
memory, including on urgent issues).
181. See Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act of
2017, H.R. 26, 115th Cong. (as passed by House, Jan. 5, 2017).
182. One poison pill: all existing regulations would expire in ten years unless
expressly approved by Congress. Id. § 809(b). Moreover, the bill lacks realistic
procedures to consider the immense pile of regulations in that time frame. In the
meantime, people, businesses, and governments of the United States will have
little idea which of their existing regulatory protections and obligations will drop
dead in a decade. Well before then, the uncertainty would crimp the economy.
Another poison pill bars an agency from presenting a regulation to Congress for
approval when the same Congress failed to approve another regulation on the
same subject. Id. § 801(a)(5). So, if the agency discovers that a rejected regulation
would have been approved if worded somewhat differently, the agency cannot
present a new version to the same Congress. That would keep majorities in both
houses from approving a regulation they would otherwise support. This is antiregulation rather than pro-responsibility. I discuss another poison pill in the text.
183. See S.21–Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/21/cosponsors
[https://perma.cc/MYN6-ZGSH] (last visited Oct. 13, 2019).
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REINS’s sponsors can contend that they want to be responsible
without ever having to take responsibility.
One poison pill requires agencies to cut the cost of existing
regulations to offset the cost of new regulations.184 So, even if
REINS were enacted, Republican legislators could take credit
with their party’s base for wanting to control regulatory costs
while shifting blame to agencies for any reduction in regulatory
protection. Meanwhile, so long as some version of the LandisBreyer approach is not enacted, the Democrats who support
existing regulatory statutes can take credit with their party’s
base for wanting regulatory protection while shifting blame to
agencies for the regulatory burdens. This stalemate is a perfect
recipe for polarization.
If either the Democratic or Republican leaders in Congress
really wanted to submit to “the consent of the governed,” they
could introduce a bill that strips the REINS Act of its poison
pills, make clear that it applies to regulations reducing or
increasing regulatory protection, and give it a new title. One
example would be the Responsibility for Regulation Act described in Part III.B.
Such a statute would make Congress a more functional, less
polarized legislature. In voting on specific regulations, members would have to take responsibility for both the level of regulatory protection and the level of regulatory burdens. So, they
would have to face hard choices about trade-offs instead of
simply spouting slogans about polarizing positions. Now, in
contrast, majority leaders of both parties try to keep hard choices
off the floor in Congress. For example, former Republican House
Majority Leader Dennis Hastert adopted the so-called Hastert
Rule that prevented a bill from reaching the floor unless it was
supported by a majority of the majority party.185 The Democrats,
for their part, are adept at structuring bills and designing procedures to hide the hard choices.186
184. H.R. 26 § 808.
185. See MICKEY EDWARDS, THE PARTIES VERSUS THE PEOPLE: HOW TO TURN
REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS INTO AMERICANS 104 (2012).
186. For example, the Democratic bill to cut emissions of climate change gases
was assiduously structured to hide the hard choices to the detriment of controlling climate change. See David Schoenbrod & Richard B. Stewart, Opinion, The
Cap-and-Trade Bait and Switch, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2009, 12:42 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203609204574314312524495276 [https://
perma.cc/2DQV-RTP9]. Democratic Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi famously
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The extra time members of Congress would need to spend
on lawmaking in Washington to grapple with the hard choices
would be of benefit because, working in Washington only a
couple of days a week, members hardly get to know members
of the other party.187 In contrast, before the 1990s, Congress
worked longer in Washington, and members and their families
lived in Washington and got to know each other, socially as
well as at work.188 Respected observers of Congress argue that its
members and their families spending more time in Washington
would reduce the nastiness and gridlock that makes Congress
so dysfunctional.189
In sum, by taking responsibility for regulation, members of
Congress would have to make hard choices but would gain
personally to the extent they ran for office to have the satisfaction of serving their community. Given our understandably
jaundiced view of politicians, it is difficult to bear in mind what
psychology shows: that evolution has led most people to want
to do the right thing (as well as benefit themselves personally)
and this is so across the political spectrum, although our views
of what is right differ.190 Yet, members of Congress cannot be
knights questing to serve the public because the current regime
forces them to be pawns in the campaign of their party’s leaders to become and stay the leaders of the majority.191 As columnist Peggy Noonan recently wrote, “Congress knows how
hapless it looks, how riven by partisanship and skins-vs.-shirts
dumbness. For many of them it takes the tang out of things.
They know it lowers their standing in America. They grieve it.

said that “we have to pass the [health care] bill so that you can find out what’s in
it,” but later asserted that she was misunderstood. See Jonathan Capehart, Opinion,
Pelosi defends her infamous health care remark, WASH. POST (June 20, 2012), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/post/pelosi-defends-her-infamoushealth-care-remark/2012/06/20/gJQAqch6qV_blog.html?utm_term=.d119562e2f20
[https://perma.cc/X8MH-EKL6] (alteration in original).
187. SCHOENBROD, supra note 15, at 89, 94.
188. Id. at 93–94.
189. Id.
190. See generally JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE
ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION (2012).
191. See generally MORRIS P. FIORINA, UNSTABLE MAJORITIES: POLARIZATION,
PARTY SORTING, AND POLITICAL STALEMATE (2017).
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It embarrasses them. They’d like to be part of something that
works, something respected.”192
D.

How Flouting the Norm Harms
the Legislators’ Constituents

Many people believe the public is better served when agencies rather than Congress run regulation.193 This belief is understandable because Congress is less knowledgeable than the
agencies and given to posturing or worse. However, the choice
is not between the agencies or Congress running regulation but
rather whether Congress will bear responsibility for the important role it now plays in regulation.
Most current regulatory statutes order agencies to deliver
popular promises, such as health protection, but nonetheless
sidestep the hard choices.194 That way, the members of Congress
get much of the credit for the popular promises, and the agency
gets much of the blame for the burdens needed to deliver on
the promises and the failures to deliver.195
Take, for example, the pollution that came from refiners adding
lead additives to gasoline. The statute enacted in 1970 promised that health would be protected from lead completely by
1976.196 As an attorney for the Natural Resources Defense
Council in the 1970s, I won cases that aimed to push the EPA to
do its duty of achieving this goal. Nonetheless, because of pressure on the agency from politicians on both the left and right,
the EPA, during both Democratic and Republican administrations, failed to act vigorously to abate the health effects of lead
in gasoline until the mid-1980s and then only after the big oil
refiners found that they could save money if lead additives to
gasoline were banned.197
192. Peggy Noonan, Opinion, Elijah Cummings and the Little Sisters, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 24, 2019, 6:27 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/elijah-cummings-and-thelittle-sisters-11571956039 [https://perma.cc/HE4N-U44F].
193. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The American Nondelegation Doctrine, 86 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1181, 1183 (2018) (arguing that the traditional nondelegation doctrine may not “promote social welfare” based in part upon the superior
knowledge of the agencies).
194. See, e.g., SCHOENBROD, supra note 15, at 43.
195. See id. at 88–94.
196. Id. at 44.
197. On the lead litigation and its consequences, see generally SCHOENBROD,
supra note 42, at 29–38.

No. 1]

Consent of the Governed

249

To put the consequences in perspective, consider that in
2016, President Obama declared a state of emergency because
nearly one-twentieth of the children aged five and under of
Flint, Michigan, had blood lead levels of at least five micrograms.198 In the 1970s, the average blood lead level in children across the United States was three times that level.199 Back
in the 1970s, medical experts told me that, although lead in
paint caused fatally high lead levels in some children, the population-wide contamination came primarily from lead in gasoline. Congress’s unqualified promise that the Clean Air Act
would “protect health” was a pious fraud.
I began to wonder what would have happened if Congress
had itself enacted the rule that would set the pace at which to
cut lead in gasoline. Doing nothing on lead was not an option
because in 1970 “Get the Lead Out,” as some bumper stickers
read, was a popular demand.200 Congress itself, in a singular
exception to the statute’s general flight from responsibility, decided that new cars had to emit 90 percent less of a list of pollutants by 1975 but left lead off the list.201 The statute instead ordered the EPA to fully protect health from airborne lead by
1976.202 If Congress could not have passed the buck on lead, it
would have required, I estimated, at least a 50 percent cut in
the amount of lead in gasoline by 1975.203 Using the EPA health
data, I showed that this quicker start on lead would have
averted about 50,000 deaths in the United States, about equal to
American deaths in the Vietnam War.204
It is, of course, politically profitable for Congress to issue
statutory orders to agencies that allow legislators to take credit
but shift blame—so politically profitable that Congress radically
increased the number of orders to the EPA in the 1990 version
198. Yanan Wang, Untold cities across America have higher rates of lead poisoning
than Flint, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2016, 5:53 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2016/02/04/untold-cities-across-america-have-higher-ratesof-lead-poisoning-than-flint [https://perma.cc/D59P-6VYF].
199. Kathryn R. Mahaffey et al., National Estimates of Blood Lead Levels: United
States, 1976–1980: Association with Selected Demographic and Socioeconomic Factors,
307 NEW ENG. J. MED. 573, 575 (1982).
200. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 42, at 29–30.
201. Id. at 34.
202. Id. at 35.
203. Id. at 36.
204. See id. at 36–38.
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of the Clean Air Act. The phrase “the administrator . . . shall”
appears 940 times.205 Many of the orders must be performed
repeatedly. The orders are lengthy, which helps explain why
the statute’s text would fill a 450-page book. Long statutes full
of complicated orders are not unusual.206
The legislators are sufficiently skilled to issue many lengthy
orders, yet still avoid blame for the hard choices. For example,
when President Obama’s EPA issued a new ozone standard
under the statutory mandate to “protect health” from air pollutants in 2015, Democratic legislators could criticize the regulation
as insufficiently tough on pollution and Republican legislators
could criticize the regulation as too tough on the economy.207
One result of such narrow delegation is extraordinary complication. As said of the Clean Air Act by Gina McCarthy,
whom President Obama appointed assistant administrator of
EPA and then administrator, “[E]ach sector has 17 to 20 rules
that govern each piece of equipment and you’ve got to be a
neuroscientist to figure it out.”208 The complication requires big
business to hire staffs of costly experts and suffer even more
costly delays in getting permits. The consequences are worse
for smaller businesses, farmers, state and local governments,
and other entities subject to federal regulation but less able to
afford the experts.
Another result is that the statutes’ orders grow obsolete
quickly because they are based upon circumstances and understandings that change.209 Yet, because the statutes were de205. Email from Iain MacDonald, Research Assistant, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, to
author (July 19, 2009) (on file with author).
206. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat.
745 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
207. See Anthony Adragna, Republicans Criticize Ozone Rule for Impacts; Democrats Lament Lack of Tougher Standard, 46 ENV’T REP. 2901 (2015). Some members of
Congress asserted the EPA went too far and that “it’ll be important for Congress
to fight back,” id. at 2901 (quoting Senator Jeff Sessions) (internal quotation marks
omitted), but others expressed disappointment with the EPA for the rule being
“not as strong as [they] had hoped.” Id. (quoting Representative Frank Pallone)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
208. Ross Sandler & David Schoenbrod, Opinion, Holding Congress Accountable,
REG. REV. (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/02/19/sandlerschoenbrod-holding-congress-accountable/ [https://perma.cc/48QH-UNBU] (internal quotation marks omitted).
209. Id.
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signed to shift blame to the agencies, members of Congress
have no incentive to revise the statutes, even as they grow increasingly dysfunctional for their constituents.210
Consider Congress’s failure to update the environmental
statutes, almost none of which have been amended for nearly
three decades despite rapid changes in our understanding of
environmental problems and how to deal with them.211 In a
project organized by New York Law School and New York
University School of Law in 2007, some fifty environmental law
experts from across the ideological spectrum set out to show
Congress how to update these obsolete statutes. The project’s leaders—Professor Richard Stewart, former chair of the
Environmental Defense Fund, his colleague on the New York
University faculty, Professor Katrina Wyman, and I—
summarized the results in a book, Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Protection That Will Work.212 The focus was on how to
get more environmental protection at lower cost rather than
how clean is clean enough. Our proposals included greater use
of market-based alternatives instead of inefficient commandand-control regulation, leaving essentially local issues to state
and local government, and imposing direct federal regulation
of national issues such as interstate pollution.
Democrats and Republicans on Capitol Hill told us in private
they wished our reforms were already in the statutes, but that
Congress would not enact them because doing so would require
legislators to take responsibility. So, for example, Congress did
not adopt the Breaking the Logjam proposal to deal with the
large stationary sources of interstate major pollutants by enacting a national cap-and-trade system.213 That system would
make it profitable to invent and use less expensive ways to cut
pollution.214 Instead, the current statute requires the EPA to tell

210. Id.
211. The exception is the Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90
Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2697 (2012 & Supp. V
2018)), which was amended by the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the
21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 114-182, 130 Stat. 448 (2016) (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2629).
212. SCHOENBROD ET AL., LOGJAM, supra note 5.
213. See id. at 87–94.
214. See id. at 88–89.
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the upwind states to limit pollution sufficiently to reduce harm
in downwind states.215
This wackadoodle system serves members of Congress by interposing the EPA and state officials between them and their
constituents, all while making pollution control more expensive. The current system results in more pollution that kills
constituents. During the Obama Administration, the EPA calculated that the existing statute would halve ozone and particulate pollution, which are the major air pollution killers, thereby
adding six months to the lifespan of the average American. A
congressionally imposed national cap-and-trade system could
easily halve the pollution again and, based upon the EPA’s
health analysis, add another three months to the average life.216
So, the average young person will die a quarter year sooner
under the current statute.
In sum, with Congress exerting power over agencies, the
choice is no longer whether experts in agencies or legislators
should run regulation. Rather, the choice is whether Congress
shall bear responsibility for its role in regulation. By delegating
the legislative power to make regulatory law, members of
Congress evade responsibility for how they wield power and,
as a result, wield it irresponsibly.217
Consider how the incentives of members of Congress would
change if they had to vote on regulations. They would then
bear personal responsibility for the failure to deliver popular
benefits and the imposition of unpopular burdens. A challenger
in a future election could then blame the incumbent for inflicting bad consequences on voters. It is recorded votes on rules—
not debate, sound bites, or votes for popular goals—that would
make members of Congress responsible for regulations in future elections. The upshot: although the legislators themselves
would spend much less time on each regulation than does the
agency and voters would not read the regulations, the legisla215. See id. at 92.
216. Bill Pedersen & David Schoenbrod, The Overwhelming Case for Clean Air Act
Reform, 43 ENV’T L. REP. 10,969, 10,969 (2013).
217. They can, however, influence regulation in other ways, such as through the
power of the purse and the power to investigate, as Professor Josh Chafetz convincingly shows. See generally JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2017). Such influence can be
wielded in ways that allow the legislators to escape responsibility for the hard
choices.
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tors would still fear the blame that they might come to bear for
the consequences of their votes in the next election, or the next,
or the next.
As Dean Landis wrote, his suggestion would “have the administrative as the technical agent in the initiation of rules of
conduct, yet at the same time to have the legislative share in
the responsibility for their adoption.”218 Responsibility for significant regulation would better align the interests of legislators
and their constituents. With legislators bearing responsibility
for the consequences of regulation for constituents, more of the
skill that the legislators now employ to make themselves look
good would be put in service of producing regulations that better please their constituents. Agency experts would become
Congress’s allies in showing how to update statutes to allow
agencies to promulgate regulations that produce better consequences for constituents. In sum, the interests of the legislators
and their constituents would be better aligned.
Congress will not, of course, construct a monument in
memory of the 50,000 victims of its failure on lead in gasoline
even though it funded a monument in memory of the like
number of American service members who died in the Vietnam
War. Nor will it build monuments for the millions of other victims of its shirking. The Court should start to do its job and
thereby stop endorsing Congress’s pious frauds.
IV.

WHAT THE COURT SHOULD DO
A.

The Court’s Job

A book published in May 2019 by Professor Lawrence Lessig,
Fidelity & Constraint: How the Supreme Court Has Read the American
Constitution,219 helps show how the Court could, and why it
should, substantially enforce the consent-of-the-governed
norm. In its almost 600 pages, the book provides a model of
“the practice of the Supreme Court as it has interpreted our
Constitution” that explains the work of Justices from across the
ideological spectrum from the early years to modern times.220

218. LANDIS, supra note 158, at 76.
219. LESSIG, supra note 93.
220. Id. at 2. Professor Lessig asserts that the model describes the behavior of
Justices on the Left and Right. Id. at 17.
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The model has two parts: “fidelity to meaning,” referring to
the meaning of the Constitution’s provisions, and “fidelity to
role,” referring to the constraints on the enforcement of that
meaning imposed by the Court’s role in a republic.221 Professor
Lessig writes that decisions prompted by constraints “are instances of infidelity (to meaning) in order to preserve or enable
the capacity of the judicial institution more generally.”222
Professor Lessig does not himself apply this model to the
consent-of-the-governed norm. Nonetheless, his analysis of fidelity to role is applicable to the impediments to that norm’s
enforcement.223
The first impediment to full enforcement of the norm discussed in Part II is the inability of Congress to make all the
federal rules of private conduct and thereby to fully conform
to the original meaning of the norm. The Court requiring the
impossible of Congress would jeopardize the authority of
the Court.224 Originalists could avoid this impossibility by
recognizing such impracticality as an impediment to judicial
enforcement.225
The second impediment to enforcement discussed in Part II
is the lack of a judicially manageable test. Professor Lessig
states the Court bows out when it lacks a judicially manageable
221. See id. at 5. Fidelity to meaning asks, according to Professor Lessig, “How
does a judge preserve the meaning of the Constitution’s text within the current
interpretative context?” Id. at 16. Professor Lessig describes the process as one of
“translation.” Id. at 49–67. He argues that both the Left and Right do it. See id. at 257.
222. Id. at 451 (emphasis added).
223. Professor Lessig does mention Schechter and Panama Refining, but does not
use his model to analyze them. See id. at 88–89, 92–93.
224. As Justices sometimes state, “the Constitution . . . is not a suicide pact.”
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).
225. Jurists who are not originalist could, according to Professor Lessig’s model,
translate original meanings to achieve their purposes in the modern context. An
example of such a translation is the power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the
several States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. That clause was meant to limit Congress’s
power, but as the amount of interstate commerce grew, the original meaning of
the clause put no substantial limit on Congress’s power. The Justices, Professor
Lessig concludes, came to see this “effectively unlimited power of the federal
government as inconsistent with the Framers’ design. They adopted an interpretive strategy to correct for that inconsistency—translation.” LESSIG, supra note 93,
at 92. Similarly, a jurist who embraced Professor Lessig’s concept of translation
might read the consent-of-the-governed norm to have made Congress responsible
in a way thought feasible in early times. In our more complicated times, such a
jurist could then translate the norm to mean that Congress must make itself responsible to a practical extent.
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test because otherwise it would seem to be acting politically,
thereby jeopardizing its credibility as a judicial institution.226
The state-the-rule definition of the norm is judicially manageable because it rides on a difference of kind (lawmaking versus
law interpretation and application), but the “intelligible principle” test is not.227 The question is whether the Justices can come
up with a judicially manageable way to deal with the first impediment. The answer will be discussed in Part IV.B.
The third impediment discussed in Part II is strong public
opinion in favor of delegation. As was shown, there is no such
strong opinion now. When overwhelming political opposition
does exist, however, it is another constraint, according to
Professor Lessig.228 That the Court would back down in the face of
political opposition may seem strange given that the Constitution
is supposedly counter-majoritarian. That is why Professor Lessig
notes, “It is in [the nature of this constraint] that its nature cannot be announced.”229
Professor Lessig goes on to state that because political opposition sufficient to make the Court suppress the meaning of the
Constitution “was a kind of force majeure, then it follows that
when the force is removed, the obligation to return to the
Constitution’s . . . meaning returns as well.”230
The fourth impediment to enforcement of the consent-of-thegoverned norm discussed in Part II is reliance on Congress’s
ability to delegate. The four impediments are related. The judicially unmanageable “intelligible principle” test was adopted
as a way of avoiding giving Congress an impossible task, and
in turn, it built reliance on the current regulatory system. The
Court’s attempt to enforce the norm without showing how to
cope with that reliance could then result in overwhelming political opposition.

226. See LESSIG, supra note 93, at 42. Thus, the Court cannot seem to be acting
politically rather than judicially. Id. at 154–57.
227. David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1224 (1985).
228. See LESSIG, supra note 93, at 450.
229. Id. at 452.
230. Id. at 431. Professor Lessig cites other examples. See id. at 85–90, 357–63.
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Professor Lessig shows that the Court has repeatedly adopted
new ways to better enforce constitutional norms.231 As he argues, “[W]hat a court needs when it recognizes failure is the
freedom to try again: ‘Our aim is to preserve X. We have tried
techniques A and B; they’ve proven too costly. We’ll now try
C.’”232 To enforce the consent-of-the-governed norm, the Court
needs a judicially manageable test with which Congress could
comply and a way to take account of reliance on the current
regulatory system.
Searching for such a test is the Court’s job. The search can
succeed.
B.

How the Court Could Do Its Job

The design of such a test, and the choice of how Congress
would comply with it, will have policy implications. To avoid
intruding into policy more than necessary to enforce constitutional norms, courts often try to get political branches to tackle
such policy choices in a way that is consistent with the norms
before themselves taking more intrusive action.233 So, in cases
where legislative districting violates the one-person, one-vote
norm, courts give the state legislature an opportunity to reapportion the districts—a decision with profound effects on who
gets elected—in a way that complies with the Constitution. As
the Court stated in Reynolds v. Sims,234 “[J]udicial relief becomes
appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after
having had an adequate opportunity to do so.”235

231. See, e.g., id. at 172 (“If [Justice] Jackson’s view was that the Court couldn’t
enforce the limits of the Constitution because he couldn’t craft a judicially administrable rule, that left open the possibility that other, more creative, justices could
do so later.”); id. at 192–94 (discussing the opinion by Chief Justice Roberts concluding that the Affordable Care Act exceeded Congress’s commerce power but
upholding it under the taxing power); id. at 196–204 (discussing the doctrine of
state and federal immunity and the process of translation in the Court’s analysis
despite political pressures).
232. Id. at 269.
233. See generally ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE:
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT (2003). We showed that courts
can prompt a political branch to tackle a question of policy in a way that respects
consent of the governed. See id. at 193–222.
234. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
235. Id. at 586.
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The upshot from giving elected officials a chance can be, if all
goes well, a division of labor in which the elected officials
make most of the policy choices and the judges stick largely to
enforcing rights. This approach might help the Court get
Congress to take substantial responsibility for regulation even
though the legislature in this matter sits high on Capitol Hill
and prefers to avoid responsibility. One reason is that, as
shown in Part II.A, the Court would have an ally that is even
more powerful than Congress: public opinion.
Calling upon elected officials to help decide how, but not
whether, to remedy the most significant violations of the consentof-the-governed norm is better than starting by rolling out the
guillotine to kill some statute found to violate the norm. The
call should make the following points:
(1) Members of Congress, having sworn to uphold the
Constitution, are duty bound to bring themselves into
compliance with the consent-of-the-governed norm to the
extent practical;
(2) It would be practical for them at the very least to vote on
the regulations deemed significant under the longstanding executive order;
(3) The process through which Congress organizes itself to
cast such votes is up to Congress, but one option is the
Landis-Breyer proposal;
(4) That process must, however, comply with Article I, including its requirement that “the Yeas and Nays of the
Members of either House on any question shall, at the
Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the
Journal;”236 and
236. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. Compliance with the Journal Clause is vital to
make members of Congress personally responsible for the exercise of legislative
powers. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 670–71 (1892). Such responsibility is in
turn vital to achieve the key purposes of Article I, including consent of the governed. Field v. Clark goes on to state in dicta that the Court has a duty “to give full
effect to the provisions of the Constitution relating to the enactment of laws.” Id.
at 670. The Court fulfilled that duty in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), and Clinton
v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). In those two cases, the Court insisted that
Congress must comply with the Article I legislative process in exercising legislative powers. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438–39; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945. There is no denying that a vote to comply with the consent-of-the-governed norm is the exercise of
a legislative power or that the Journal Clause is part of the Article I legislative
process. Although Chadha and Clinton dealt with departures from Article I, Section 7
and the Journal Clause invoked here is in Section 5, that is a distinction without a
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(5) If the Court finds that Congress has failed to do its duty
by a date certain, the courts, also duty bound to enforce
the Constitution, will act. Such action would be to strike
any new rule of private conduct brought before the Court
whose promulgation by an agency has not been approved through the Article I legislative process, unless
the government shows that the rule is not significant.
Optimally, but not necessarily, the Court would issue the call
to Congress in a case that does not directly threaten the reliance
interest in delegations to expert agencies. Chadha or Clinton
suggest the kind of case I have in mind. Both involved statutes
that, as I have argued, could be described as delegating legislative power but not to an expert agency.237 Other such cases
could come along, as suggested by President Trump’s supposed order to American companies to stop doing business in
China.238
If Congress does not respond to the call by the date certain,
the Court would replace the judicially unmanageable “intelligible principle” test with one geared to whether the regulation
is significant. A test based upon the significance of each rule
has a strong foundation in precedent. As already noted, the
Court in its 1825 decision in Wayman v. Southard stated that
Congress may delegate power to issue “minor regulations.”239
This language in Wayman does not appear in Justice Gorsuch’s
dissent in Gundy.240
difference. Section 7 also contains a separate Journal Clause applicable to votes to
override a presidential veto. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Both Journal Clauses require recording “the yeas and nays” in matters arousing important disagreement.
Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
The House of Representatives now uses an electronic method to record “the
yeas and nays” without the time-consuming process of calling each legislator by
name. If, however, there is some practical impediment to comply with the yeas
and nays requirement of Article I, Section 5 in every context, Congress can clearly
comply with it in implementing a process like the Landis-Breyer proposal because
Congress can limit its application to significant regulations and bar amendments.
Thus, the requirement is a constitutional norm the courts can enforce in the context of enforcing substantial compliance with the consent-of-the-governed norm.
237. See supra Part.II.A.
238. See Keith Bradsher & Alan Rappeport, Trump Ordered U.S. Companies to Leave
China. Is That Possible?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
08/24/business/trump-china-trade.html [https://nyti.ms/2zjvTvA].
239. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 45 (1825).
240. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131–48 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
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To define significant regulations in modern circumstances,
the Court could rely upon the definition of “significant regulatory action” in the executive order that has been in force for
more than a quarter century under two Democratic and two
Republican Presidents.241 In particular, the Court could rely
upon the first part of the executive order’s definition that defines significant regulations as having an “annual effect on the
economy of $100 million or more.”242 So, a regulation would be
deemed significant if it increased or decreased costs by such
amount. The $100 million test does not, of course, appear in the
Constitution, but the Court regularly adopts bright-line tests to
make judicially manageable enforcement of norms that the
Constitution states in amorphous terms.243 The Court, however,
would not need to adopt such a test if Congress itself adopts a
definition that is at least as inclusive. And, even if Congress
fails to so do and the Court adopts the $100 million definition,

241. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641–42 (1994), reprinted as
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (2012).
242. Id. § 3(f)(1).
243. Here are some examples. Faced with enforcing the constitutional provision
that requires the President to get the consent of the Senate for important appointments except “during the Recess of the Senate” but does not define “recess,” U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3, the Court decided that Senate confirmation is presumptively needed if it is out of session for less than ten days. NLRB v. Canning, 573
U.S. 513, 538 (2014). Faced with enforcing the Equal Protection Clause’s requirement that both houses of the state legislature must be apportioned based on population, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, but acknowledging that some deviations
from population equality may be necessary, the Court decided that population
deviations of 10 percent or less were insufficient to make a prima facie case of
invidious discrimination. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983). Faced with
enforcing the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial without defining the size of
that jury, U.S. CONST. amend. VI, the Court decided that a jury with less than six
members would impair the purpose and function of the jury. Ballew v. Georgia,
435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978). Faced with enforcing the constitutional provision requiring probable cause for searches and seizures without defining a timeline for
providing probable cause, U.S. CONST. amend. IV, the Court decided that determination of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will as a general matter comply
with the promptness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. County of Riverside
v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). The Court also deals with amorphous constitutional norms by adopting bright-line tests that are not numerical. See, e.g.,
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986) (holding that police cannot initiate
an interrogation after a defendant has requested counsel), rev’d by Montejo v.
Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699–701, 704–
05 (1981) (finding an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement for temporary detentions when there is a warrant to search a house for
drugs).
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Congress could supplant it later by adopting a definition that is
at least as inclusive.
The executive order’s definition goes on to include additional
grounds for finding a regulation significant.244 These additional
grounds are, however, amorphous and so would raise problems of judicial manageability. The Court should leave these
additional grounds out of its own test of significance. Congress
could, however, include them in any statute it passes in response to the Court’s call for action or later.
Professors Steven Calabresi and Gary Lawson have also suggested a test based upon the $100 million figure in the executive order.245 They helpfully point out that although this “line is
concededly arbitrary . . . it is not obvious to us why an underinclusive arbitrary line is worse than no line at all.”246
Unlike the “intelligible principle” test, the $100 million test
would be judicially manageable. “Intelligible principle” is unmanageable because it looks to how much the statute says
about the goals that the agency must pursue. With statutes calling for agencies to pursue a wide variety of goals—such as protecting health, stopping unfair trade practices, or preventing
discrimination—rank ordering how much the statutes say
about goals would be like comparing the proverbial apples and
oranges. Nor is there any objective scale on which to set a cutoff as to how much intelligibility is enough.247
In contrast, the $100 million test does provide an objective
scale. Of course, determining the economic impact of a regulation does involve estimating, but the courts could put the burden on the agency to show that its regulation has an impact
244. The definition goes on to include regulatory actions that “adversely affect
in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities.” Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f)(1), 3 C.F.R. at 641. It
would be consistent with the consent-of-the-governed norm if the President
amended the definition to, say, define as significant regulations with annual benefits of $100 million or more or adjusted the $100 million cut-off to take account of
inflation.
245. Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Depravity of the 1930s and the Modern Administrative State, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 821, 856–57 (2018).
246. Id. at 857.
247. See Schoenbrod, supra note 227, at 1231, cited with approval in Gundy v.
United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2140 n.62 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see also
Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 79 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 927 (1997).
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that is below the benchmark. Reviewing such a showing is
standard judicial work. Alternatively, Congress could assign
the estimation job to the Congressional Budget Office.248
The new test would be judicially manageable even under the
strict concept of manageability the majority in Rucho v. Common
Cause249 used to find that the courts could not judge claims of
unfair partisan gerrymandering.250 The majority found that
claims of political gerrymandering “have proved far more difficult to adjudicate” than those claiming violations of the oneperson, one-vote rule.251 “The basic reason is that, although it is
illegal for a jurisdiction to depart from the one-person, onevote rule, or to engage in racial discrimination in districting, ‘a
jurisdiction may engage in [some] constitutional political gerrymandering.’”252 In contrast, the original meaning of the consentof-the-governed norm is every bit as absolute as that of the
one-person, one-vote norm.
There are, however, impediments to complete judicial enforcement of both the one-person, one-vote norm and the consentof-the-governed norm as originally defined. With one-person,
one-vote, the impediment is that the state has a legitimate
interest in matters other than complete equality in the populations of legislative districts. One such interest is making legislative boundaries correspond to municipal boundaries. So, courts
presumptively uphold the districting if the deviations among
the populations of districts do not exceed ten percent.253 With
248. Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 245, at 856 n.163.
249. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
250. See id. at 2500–02.
251. Id. at 2497.
252. Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999)).
253. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842–43 (1983); see also Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964); SANDRA M. STEVENSON & WENDY VAN WIE, 6 ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 86.04(2) (2d ed. 2019); John P. Ludington,
Annotation, Constitutionality of Legislative Apportionment: Supreme Court Cases, 77 L.
ED. 2d 1496 (2012).
The Rucho majority goes on to argue that:
Even if we were to accept the dissent’s proposed baseline, it would return
us to “the original unanswerable question (How much political
motivation and effect is too much?).” Would twenty percent away from
the median map be okay? Forty percent? Sixty percent? Why or why
not? . . . The dissent argues that there are other instances in law where
matters of degree are left to the courts. True enough. But those instances
typically involve constitutional or statutory provisions or common law
confining and guiding the exercise of judicial discretion.
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the original meaning of the consent-of-the-governed norm, one
impediment is Congress cannot enact all the rules, as discussed
in Part II.
With the one-person, one-vote norm, the impediment to
complete judicial enforcement—other legitimate state interests—guides how much deviation from equality to allow. With
the consent-of-the-governed norm, the impediment to judicial
enforcement—legislative practicality—could guide the choice
of a cutoff on the significance of regulations.
Although deciding how best to circumvent the impediments
to enforcement of the consent-of-the-norm would require the
exercise of some discretion, requiring Congress to vote on
significant regulations would circumvent the biggest embarrassment that would result from instructing the lower courts to
distinguish between “important subjects which must be entirely
regulated by the legislature itself,” and “those of less interest,
in which a general provision may be made, and power given to
those who are to act . . . to fill up the details.”254 The courts
would not be seen to be picking and choosing among regulatory
statutes or agency actions. Rather, the norm would apply to all
new regulations with an annual effect on the economy of $100
million or more under all statutes, whether they increase or decrease regulatory protection.
That Congress should vote on all significant regulations already has a certain bipartisan pedigree. As already noted, it
came from a leading New Dealer (Dean Landis) and was elaborated by a Supreme Court Justice who is an expert in regulation
and was appointed by a Democratic President (Justice Breyer).
Subsequently, Republican legislators in the House have repeatedly passed the REINS bill, which incorporates a version of the
Landis-Breyer proposal. Yet, as shown in Part III.C, both parties in Congress have worked to avoid subjecting their members to the responsibility the Landis-Breyer approach would
impose.
Rolling out the guillotine would be easier after having called
upon Congress to address the problem and when single regulations, rather than entire statutes, are to be struck. Previously
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2505 (citations omitted). In contrast, the Court found that there
would be conflicting concepts of what constitutes reasonable fairness in legislative
districting. See id. at 2504–07.
254. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825).
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having discussed the norm and Congress’s failure to adhere to
it to the extent practical, the Court’s constitutional intervention
would not come as surprise. Moreover, the Court will have
made clear it prefers Congress to make the policy judgments
needed to comply with the norm. Indeed, even if Congress initially fails to decide how it will bear responsibility and the
Court holds that it will strike significant regulations Congress
has not approved, Congress could come up with an alternative
way of taking responsibility. Professor Lessig argues that the
Court can allow such leeway.255
Congress might respond constructively to a call from the
Court to honor the consent-of-the-governed norm despite the
credit-claiming, blame-shifting advantage its members now
reap from delegation. The call would highlight the clash between their current behavior and, as discussed in Part II.A, the
public’s overwhelming desire for a government based upon a
consent of the governed and, in particular, for a Congress that
takes responsibility for policy. As such, failure of the lawmakers in Congress to take responsibility for the laws would bring
blame. Still more blame would come from failing to adopt reforms that would remove the cloud of uncertainty as to the validity of existing regulations. If Congress fails to remove that
cloud, the Court would have strong justification for itself deciding not to apply the new test to old regulations.256
255. Professor Lessig argues that courts should accede to a legislature’s way of
complying with the meaning of the Constitution “where the legislature has done
the important work of translation itself.” LESSIG, supra note 93, at 272.
256. The Court could avoid applying the new test to old regulations despite the
statement in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993), that:
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that
rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full
retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all
events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our
announcement of the rule. . . . [W]e now prohibit the erection of selective
temporal barriers to the application of federal law in non-criminal cases.
Id. at 97. Yet, as previously described in Part III.C, applying a new and stronger
test of the consent-of-the-governed norm to old regulations would cause great
pain given the ensuing uncertainty about the validity of the huge volume of old
regulations. Fortunately, however, Harper should not control here because the
reasons the Court gave in that case either do not apply here or do so very weakly,
especially given that Harper itself announced its own, new judicially created retroactivity rule. What the Court did there in one direction, it can do again in another
direction on another quite distinct issue. One reason offered in Justice Thomas’s
opinion for the Court in Harper is that the judicial function “strips us of the quin-

264

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 43

Moreover, both businesses and advocates of strong regulation
would rankle at agencies being unable to change regulations.
Incumbents could take credit now for enacting the reform, and
responsibility for the hard choices on regulation could be postponed until after the next election. That responsibility would
apply to both parties whereas now either party in Congress
that unilaterally gives up the credit-claiming, blame-shifting
advantages of delegation would put itself at an electoral disadvantage. Finally, a Congress whose approval ratings have
dipped as low as the single digits in recent years lacks the credibility with the public to put up much of a fight.257 Moreover, a
failure by Congress to respond constructively would legitimate
more intrusive judicial action.
Eventual success in getting Congress to take responsibility
for significant new rules would tend to reduce the impediments to the Court enforcing the norm and enable it to require
Congress to begin gradually to take responsibility for the most
important old rules. Moreover, as Christopher DeMuth has
tessentially ‘legislat[ive]’ prerogative to make rules of law retroactive or prospective as we see fit.” Id. at 95 (alteration in original) (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky,
479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987)). This point is too broad because, as Justice Scalia recognized, “[A] certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most
executive or judicial action . . . .” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Another reason offered in Justice Thomas’s opinion
is that “selective application of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly
situated [parties] the same.” Harper, 509 U.S. at 95 (alteration in original) (quoting
Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323) (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet applying the consent-of-the-governed norm retroactively would, given the ensuing uncertainty
and upset, harm just about everyone. Moreover, the parties subject to the old regulations did not rely upon the Court applying the new test of the norm to old
regulations and so have no reliance interest in the courts’ doing so. Finally, Justice
Scalia’s concurring opinion in Harper offers an additional reason for retrospectivity:
“Prospective decisionmaking is the handmaid of judicial activism . . . .” Id. at 105
(Scalia, J., concurring). The Court’s earlier carving of a giant exception to the consent-of-the-governed norm constitutes massive judicial activism. In sum, if need
be, a strong case can be made that the rule in Harper should not apply in the consent-of-the-governed norm’s application to old regulations.
257. Americans’ Approval of Congress Drops to Single Digits, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25,
2011), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/10/25/us/
politics/approval-of-congress-drops-to-single-digits.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
5TL8-8BP8]. Recent Gallup polls found that voters approved of how the Supreme
Court does its job by a margin of 54 to 42 percent but disapprove of how Congress
does its job by margin of 68 to 27 percent. Gallup Poll, Supreme Court, GALLUP, https://
news.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-court.aspx [https://perma.cc/VQ5H-TLX6] (last
visited Jan. 3, 2020); Congress and the Public, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/
1600/congress-public.aspx [https://perma.cc/KH5T-ND69] (last visited Jan. 3, 2020).
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suggested, a President who wants Congress to take responsibility
for regulation has diverse means to force Congress to do so.258
V.

FAR-FETCHED RATIONALES FOR IGNORING THE NORM
A.

The Constitution Permits Congress to
Leave Lawmaking to Agencies

Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule contend that “a
statutory grant of authority to the executive branch or other
agents never effects a delegation of legislative power” and that
no authority to the contrary appears until the late 1800s.259 For
example, they argue that Locke’s statement that a legislature
may not delegate its legislative powers “is fully consistent”
with their position that Congress may pass statutes that authorize the executive branch to make law but may not authorize it
to pass statutes.260
Professors Posner and Vermeule’s article reveals the weakness of their argument by failing to even mention, let alone trying to distinguish, Federalist No. 75, Fletcher v. Peck, or Gibbons v.
Ogden.261 The article also reveals its weakness by contending
258. Christopher DeMuth, Presidential Reform of the Regulatory State 18 (Feb.
2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ccdemuth.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/
05/Presidential-Reform-of-the-Regulatory-State.pdf [https://perma.cc/P34Z-Q3TG].
259. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 26, at 1721–22.
260. Id. at 1727. Similarly, Professor Cynthia Farina argues that, because the
President can delegate, so can Congress. Cynthia R. Farina, Deconstructing Nondelegation, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 90–93 (2010). For a rousing rebuttal, see
Ronald A. Cass, Delegation Reconsidered: A Delegation Doctrine for the Modern Administrative State, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 178–81 (2017).
261. Professors Posner and Vermeule do discuss Brig Aurora but, in quoting it,
omit the language that indicates the Court upheld the statute on the basis that it
gave the President the power to apply a rule by finding “the occurrence of any subsequent combination of events” rather than to proclaim a rule. Posner & Vermeule,
supra note 26, at 1737–38. In particular, they omit the sentence that suggests that
the President’s job was to find facts rather than make law: “The 19th section of
that act declaring that it should continue in force to a certain time, and no longer,
could not restrict their power of extending its operation, without limitation upon
the occurrence of any subsequent combination of events.” Cargo of the Brig Aurora
v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 388 (1813). They may have missed the
importance of this language because they looked for evidence of the “intelligible
principle” in Wayman v. Southard and unsurprisingly not finding it, conclude the
Court displayed no definitive signs of a concern with delegation until late 1892.
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 26, at 1722, 1738–39.
Professor Jerry Mashaw objects to characterizing the President’s role as one of
rule application. “The Court’s description of the President’s role, which involved
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that its argument is consistent with “[t]he Framers’ principal
concern [of] legislative aggrandizement—the legislative seizure
of powers belonging to other institutions.”262 That leaves out a
concern that is at least as fundamental to the Framers—consent
of the governed. As Justice Kagan recently wrote, “If there is a
single idea that made our Nation (and that our Nation commended to the world), it is this one: The people are sovereign.”263 Yet, Professors Posner and Vermeule do not even mention Federalist No. 51 and its position that, to repeat, “[a]
dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on
the government.”264
B.

Even Early Congresses Ignored the Norm

Professor Jerry Mashaw contends that, whatever the people
were told about consent of the governed in the late 1700s, early
elected officials never felt obliged to comply with any such
norm.265 He writes, “From the earliest days of the Republic,
Congress delegated broad authority to administrators, armed
them with extrajudicial coercive powers, created systems of
administrative adjudication, and specifically authorized administrative rulemaking.”266
He goes on to state that “any claim that early Congresses declined to delegate broad authority to others must . . . conjure
with the First Bank of the United States. The Bank’s function, in
effect if not in form, was essentially that now served by the

delicate diplomatic negotiations, complex bilateral understandings, and uncertain
compliance, was surely a model of understatement concerning the presidential
discretion effectively conferred on him to find a fact.” JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF
AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 99 (2012). Yes, the President got to set the strategy
to get other nations to respect American neutrality, but the President’s job with
respect to the rule enforced in Brig Aurora was far simpler: to find whether other
nations were respecting American neutrality.
262. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 26, at 1733.
263. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2511 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
264. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 4, at 319 (James Madison).
265. MASHAW, supra note 261, at 25. Though disagreeing with this argument, I
nonetheless admire his book for showing that the early federal government had a
larger administrative apparatus than previously understood and that the separations among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches were far from neat.
266. Id. at 5. Professors Posner and Vermeule make a similar argument, but I
will focus on Professor Mashaw’s version because it is more detailed and was
written more recently. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 26, at 1732–41.

No. 1]

Consent of the Governed

267

Federal Reserve Board in regulating the money supply.”267
Professor Mashaw’s example makes it seem that Congress
granted the First Bank legislative power because the Federal
Reserve does now impose rules regulating how much banks
can lend in order, in part, to control the money supply.268 Yet,
the law establishing the First Bank did not give it the power to
regulate other banks.269 It did affect the money supply, but by
deciding how much money it would lend. Congress could have
taken that decision away from the First Bank but leaving it
with First Bank was not a delegation of legislative power.
In this example and many others, Professor Mashaw fails to
demonstrate that the early Congresses systematically delegated
their power to make the rules of private conduct because he
conflates (1) Congress ceding legislative powers which it alone
was supposed to exercise (such as making the rules of private
conduct) with (2) Congress letting others make decisions that
Congress itself need not make but could and sometimes did
(such as allowing a bank to decide how much money it would
lend). The two are distinct, as Dean Ronald Cass shows.270 Yet,
Professor Mashaw applies the word “delegate” to both. That is
semantically correct but is nonetheless confusing because only
the first violates the norm that Article I establishes.271
In his extended analysis of Professor Mashaw’s book, Professor
Joseph Postell shows that early Congresses “largely refrained”
from delegating legislative powers to administrators and did so
because of their commitment to the constitutional principle of
nondelegation.272 There were some temporary deviations in
which Congress granted lawmaking powers to administrators,
most notably the infamous Embargo of 1807 to 1809.273 Professor
Mashaw writes that the embargo statutes “featured stunning
267. MASHAW, supra note 261, at 47.
268. 12 U.S.C. § 84 (2012).
269. An Act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States, ch.
10, 1 Stat. 191 (1791).
270. Cass, supra note 260, at 155–58. The distinction appears in Wayman v.
Southard. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42–43 (1825).
271. Many of Professor Mashaw’s examples of Congress delegating are of its
letting others do what Congress itself did not have to do. See, e.g., MASHAW, supra
note 261, at 46 (granting the President the power to decide how to distribute congressional appropriated funds to veterans).
272. POSTELL, supra note 24, at 78.
273. MASHAW, supra note 261, at 91–118.

268

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 43

delegations of discretionary authority both to the President and
lower-level officials,” and therefore it “has much to teach us
about early understandings of the nondelegation doctrine.”274
This embargo that began in 1807—the one in Brig Aurora275
arose under later legislation—was, as Professor Mashaw helpfully explains, borne out of desperation.276 In the course of a
war with each other, Britain and France seized American merchant ships and kidnapped their crews.277 These were acts of
war against the United States, which was neutral in the conflict,
but American officials were afraid of responding militarily
against great powers.278 As an alternative, President Thomas
Jefferson recommended keeping American ships at home and
depriving Britain and France of American exports.279 He asked
Congress to authorize such action and it did so.280
It is, however, wrong to conclude that the Embargo of 1807
to 1809 signifies acceptance of delegation.281 The statute generated protest in Congress that led ultimately to cutting back the
President’s power.282 As Professor Postell sums up, “[T]he embargo was a temporary deviation from the typical policy decisions of the early republic, one that that was nearly universally
acknowledged as a colossal failure, and thus is of very limited
value as an indication of what early American politicians regarded as legitimate.”283 It certainly was not an example of the
congressional buck passing that drives so much delegation today.
Indeed, the embargo brought blame.
Another example that Professor Mashaw highlights is how
Congress responded to the dangers of a new technology,
steamboats.284 The boilers of early steamboats tended to explode
274. Id. at 90.
275. Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813).
276. MASHAW, supra note 261, at 91–92.
277. Id. at 91.
278. Id. at 91–92.
279. Id. at 92.
280. Id. at 92–93.
281. Professor Philip Hamburger argues the legislation might be seen as giving
the President the power to determine facts that would trigger the applicability
of law rather than to make law. PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
UNLAWFUL? 107–10 (2014).
282. MASHAW, supra note 261, at 96.
283. POSTELL, supra note 24, at 78.
284. MASHAW, supra note 261, at 187–208.
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with fatal consequences.285 Congress passed the Steamboat Act
of 1852, which Professor Mashaw cites as an instance of early
Congresses freely delegating the power to make rules of private conduct.286 It was not such an early Congress, coming as it
did six decades after the ratification of the Constitution, and
not much of an example at that. The statute, as he describes it,
used “administrative rulemaking as a principal technique for
articulating regulatory standards.”287 Yet, Professor Postell
finds only two sections of the statute where “[t]he supervising
inspectors were given rulemaking power.”288 One called for the
inspectors, as the statute put it, to make rules “for their own
conduct” and that of the inspectors working under them.289
This power, Professor Postell aptly argues, was not to make
rules governing private conduct, but rather to govern official
conduct and so did not violate the consent-of-the-governed
norm.290
The other provision called for the inspectors to make rules
for ships passing each other.291 The genesis of this provision
suggests no comfort with Congress empowering others to
make rules of private conduct. As Professor Postell recounts,
the bill, as originally introduced, contained a section with detailed rules on this subject based upon traditional practices.292
Legislators objected because they did not understand the section and particularly how these practices, which varied with
whether a ship was going upstream or downstream, applied
when tides reverse the direction of the water’s flow, as can
happen far inland in some rivers.293 At the end of the legislative
process in the House, the House passed a bill which included
150 amendments, one of which gave the inspectors broad rulemaking authority over ships passing each other.294 The Senate

285. Id. at 188.
286. Id. at 192.
287. Id. at 152.
288. POSTELL, supra note 24, at 98.
289. Act of August 30, 1852, ch. 106, § 18, 10 Stat. 61, 70.
290. POSTELL, supra note 24, at 98–99.
291. Ch. 106, § 29, 10 Stat. 61 at 72.
292. POSTELL, supra note 24, at 99.
293. Id. at 100.
294. Id.
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acceded because it was left with the choice of the House bill or no
bill at all dealing with the deaths from steamboat explosions.295
The original language suggests members of Congress expected to state the rules themselves. The great bulk of the bill
showed them doing so. It is often highly specific, containing
detailed rules on a wide range of issues bearing on steamboat
safety, from availability of lifeboats and firefighting equipment
to the pressure in boilers, and much more.296 Here is one example:
That every vessel so propelled by steam, and carrying passengers, shall have not less than three double-acting forcing
pumps, with chamber at least four inches in diameter, two to
be worked by hand and one by steam, if steam can be employed, otherwise by hand; one whereof shall be placed near
the stern, one near the stem, and one amidship; each having
a suitable, well-fitted hose, of at least two thirds the length
of the vessel, kept at all times in perfect order and ready for
immediate use; each of which pumps shall also be supplied
with water by a pipe connected therewith, and passing
through the side of the vessel, so low as to be at all times in
the water when she is afloat: Provided, That, in steamers not
exceeding two hundred tons measurement, two of said
pumps may be dispensed with; and in steamers of over two
hundred tons, and not exceeding five hundred tons measurement, one of said pumps may be dispensed with.297

Such detailed provisions are more like a regulation that a
modern agency would put in the Code of Federal Regulations
than an enabling statute that a modern Congress would put in
the United States Code. Yet, Professor Mashaw compares the
1852 statute with modern statutes creating “the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the Environmental Protection Agency in the 1960s
and early 1970s.”298
Professor Mashaw dismisses the specifics in the statute by
stating that the steamboat inspectors had “considerable discretion.”299 The statute did leave some room for judgment calls, as

295. Id.
296. Id. at 101.
297. Ch. 106, § 3, 10 Stat. 61 at 62.
298. MASHAW, supra note 261, at 21.
299. Id. at 192.
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in the phrase “a suitable, well-fitted hose” in the section quoted
at length above. Yet, the inspectors, who were expected to
come from the steamboat business, could base their determinations on their knowledge of practices in their line of work,300
much as common law juries in that era would base their judgments about reasonable care on practices in their own communities. Thus, the judgments left to the inspectors could be of
rule application rather than rulemaking. Alternatively, these
judgments would be considered as rulemaking of the “fill up
the details” variety. Either way, the legislators had taken responsibility for the politically salient choices. It was nothing
like modern statutes in which members of Congress grant legislative powers to avoid personal responsibility for the laws.301
In sum, for many decades after the ratification of the
Constitution, members of Congress tried to make the rules of
private conduct themselves, but sometimes fell short. As Professor
Daniel Walker Howe chronicles, legislators in the early decades
took positions on the hard choices.302 In contrast, as Part III.D
shows, modern Congresses issue detailed instructions but still
manage to skirt the hard choices.
C.

The Court Enforced the Norm in
Only One Year of Hundreds

Referring to Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry striking
down provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act in
1935, Professor Cass Sunstein quipped that the constitutional
bar on Congress delegating legislative power has “had one
good year and 211 bad ones (and counting).”303 Yet, as Professor
Mark Tushnet recently blogged, “It’s not true,” citing Carter in
1936.304 I have cited other examples: Knickerbocker Ice in 1920, L.
Cohen Grocery Store in 1921, and Washington in 1924.305 One
could also arguably cite Clinton in 1998 and Chadha in 1983, es300. Id. at 195.
301. SCHOENBROD, supra note 15, at 70–74.
302. DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICA, 1815–1848, at 125–63, 272–73 (2007); cf. WIEBE, supra note 59, at 21.
303. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000).
304. Mark Tushnet, The Nondelegation Doctrine—Correcting a Common Error,
BALKINIZATION (Dec. 22, 2018, 11:22 PM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/12/thenondelegation-doctrine-correcting.html [https://perma.cc/8SME-883T] (citing Carter
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)).
305. See supra Part II.A.
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pecially in light of the gloss put on it by Loving.306 Indeed, Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy cites these cases along with the
void for vagueness cases and other cases to show the Court has
taken the norm seriously.307 More importantly, Congress substantially honored the norm well into the 1800s.308 Brig Aurora
and Wayman upheld challenged statutes on reasonable
grounds. That the cases were brought suggests litigants were
willing to raise delegation arguments. That more cases were
not brought suggests there was not much worth challenging.
D.

The Constitution Was Amended to Eliminate the Norm

Professor Ackerman argues that the decisive reelections of
President Roosevelt after his confrontation with the Court was
a “constitutional moment” that amended the Constitution to
allow Congress to delegate its legislative powers.309 In contrast,
Professor William Leuchtenburg concludes that whatever else
the voters might have been doing in 1936, they were not consciously amending the Constitution.310 The public did not think
of itself as amending the Constitution at the time, and the
Court has not so regarded it since.311
More fundamentally, the Constitution is not just an agreement
on how government should work in response to the will of the
306. See id.
307. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141–43 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Indeed, these cases tend to undercut the Court’s rationale that Congress does
not delegate legislative power when it states an intelligible principle. Similarly, as
Professor David Strauss argues, cases before Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954), tended to undercut the “separate but equal” logic of Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896). DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 90–92 (Geoffrey
R. Stone ed., 2010). Professor Strauss states, “[T]he Court in Brown was taking one
further step in a well-established progression.” Id. at 92.
308. See supra Part II.A.
309. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 96, at 306–11; Ackerman, supra note 96, at 1053–57,
1070–71; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 421, 432 n.40, 447–48 (1987) (arguing that the New Deal amended the Constitution to allow delegation). But see, Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 924–33 (1990) (rejecting Professor Ackerman’s theory).
310. William E. Leuchtenburg, When the People Spoke, What Did They Say?: The
Election of 1936 and the Ackerman Thesis, 108 YALE L.J. 2077, 2111 (1999).
311. Id.; see also LESSIG, supra note 93, at 440 (stating in reference to Professor
Ackerman’s theory, that “it is not obvious that it was a will to amend”). Also, as
Professor Lessig argues, “The problem for Ackerman’s account . . . is that the
Court has repeatedly tried to reset the balance that was itself reset in 1937–1942.”
Id. at 430.
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governed, but it is also an agreement on how the Constitution
can be amended in response to the will of the governed. The
Constitution, of course, includes an explicit, formal process for
its amendment.312 Although there is something to be said for
substance over form, form does have its uses. A formal
amendment would have had to make clear whether the electorate opposed a procedural requirement that Congress take
responsibility, or rather that it cared more about President
Roosevelt’s policy objectives, whether any such change was
meant to be permanent or only for the duration of the emergencies of the Great Depression and World War II, and whether
the amendment permitted only the broad (“here’s a problem,
fix it”) delegations that typified the New Deal or also the narrow (“we get the credit, the agency gets the blame”) delegations of the Clean Air Act and its aftermath discussed in Part III
of this Article. Finally, if Professor Ackerman is correct that the
Constitution was amended by a shift in public opinion, why is
it not equally so that the Constitution was reamended when
public opinion later began to call for Congress to take responsibility, and Congress feigned doing so, as discussed in Parts
II.A and III.C?
E.

Delegation Is Consistent with Consent of the Governed

Professors Posner and Vermeule argue that Congress is accountable for agency-made rules. They do so in several paragraphs of suppositions about how legislators and voters behave.313 But these suppositions are not supported by reference
to the work of political scientists—the social scientists who systematically describe such behavior.314 To the contrary, political
scientists conclude that, in many circumstances, delegation al312. U.S. CONST. art. V.
313. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 26, at 1749–50.
314. Professors Posner and Vermeule do cite political scientists David Epstein &
Sharyn O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 961–62 (1999), but they cite these
political scientists for the proposition that enforcing the nondelegation doctrine
would drive Congress to delegate to legislative committees rather than administrative agencies and thereby undercut accountability another way. See Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 26, at 1749. This is not the proposition I dispute. The proposition for which Epstein and Professor O’Halloran are cited, if true, may be relevant to the issue of the extent to which courts should underenforce the norm, but
not to whether it should, as Professors Posner and Vermeule recommend, be
killed off altogether.
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lows legislators to take credit for popular consequences and
shift blame for unpopular ones.315

315. See, e.g., R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 101
(1990) (“Sometimes legislators know precisely what the executive will decide, but
the process of delegation insulates them from political retribution.”); DAVID R.
MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 132 (2d. prtg. 1975) (“[I]n a
large class of legislative undertakings the electoral payment is for positions rather
than for effects.”); Morris P. Fiorina, Group Concentration and the Delegation of Legislative Authority, in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 175 (Roger G.
Noll ed., 1985) (offering a mathematical assessment of when it pays legislators to
delegate); Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or
Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 45–47 (1982) (stating that legislators
may pick the regulatory form that makes them look best to their constituents rather than the one that does the most good for their constituents); Justin Fox &
Stuart V. Jordan, Delegation and Accountability, 73 J. POL. 831, 843–44 (2011) (identifying conditions under which delegation to agencies can provide politicians with
an element of plausible deniability); Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Winner-TakeAll Politics: Public Policy, Political Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 152, 173 (2010) (stating that wellorganized business interests pushing for favors from legislators at the expense of
the average voter “will seek to substitute symbolic actions for real ones, for example, or manipulate complex policy designs to produce more favorable yet opaque
distributional outcomes”); R. Kent Weaver, The Politics of Blame Avoidance, 6 J. PUB.
POL’Y 371, 375, 386–87 (1986) (stating that politicians pass the buck as a means to
avoid blame for unpopular actions).
In addition, researchers have used experimental subjects to test whether delegation of authority enables legislators to shift significant amounts of blame to agencies and found that it can. See, e.g., Adam Hill, Does Delegation Undermine Accountability? Experimental Evidence on the Relationship Between Blame Shifting and Control,
12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 311 (2015) (answering the question affirmatively on
the basis of experiments by multiple researchers). Of his own experiments, Hill
wrote, “Even in these cases, where the agent is effectively powerless to change the
outcome, participants blame principals significantly less than in cases where the
principal brings about the outcome directly.” Id. at 312.
Professors Posner and Vermeule also float the idea that delegation must be acceptable because delegation is used pervasively in public and private life. See
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 26, at 1744–45. Here, they attack an argument that
no one makes: delegation is invariably bad. The beef is only with delegation that
deflects blame from where it should lie rather than to achieve economies of specialization or scale. Delegation to deflect blame is a ploy used in in business as
well as government. See Andy Kessler, Opinion, Where in the World Is Larry Page?,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 31, 2018, 10:59 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/where-in-theworld-is-larry-page-11546199677 [https://perma.cc/C5FL-NTZC] (identifying some
of the corporate leaders who work through surrogates to deflect blame).
In addition, Professors Posner and Vermeule argue that legislators will engage
in “happy talk” regardless of whether they delegate. Posner & Vermeule, supra
note 26, at 1748. Perhaps, but spin is less effective than spin plus arranging to
have the bad news come on the letterhead of an agency rather than from a vote in
Congress.
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Professors Posner and Vermeule also argue that the accountability of the President as executive preserves the consent of
the governed.316 Yet, a President serving a second term escapes
accountability at the polls altogether because the Constitution
bars a third term.317 And even a first term President largely escapes blame for the burdens imposed by agencies. Some agencies are independent of presidential control. And although
most are subject to it, Presidents usually will personally announce only those rules that the White House political advisors
think will be popular.318 Otherwise, the President leaves the
announcement to the agency head. The agency head can usually
shift some of the blame to the statute or the court decisions that
structured the agency’s decision making. Everyone is responsible, so no one is.
Moreover, few if any regulatory issues become important in
a national presidential election because they are usually overshadowed by the President’s work as commander in chief, diplomat in chief, economic strategist, and national leader. These
roles generally let the President appear aloof from choices
about regulation. In contrast, how members of Congress would
vote on such regulatory issues could be important in many of
their reelection campaigns.
One might argue that voters should do the homework necessary to see through such trickery, but they will not and they
should not have to. As Professor Jeremy Waldron writes,
“[T]he agent-accountability that is involved in democracy puts
the onus of generating that transparency and the conveying of
the information that accountability requires on the persons being
held accountable. . . . [T]he agents owe the principal an account.”319

316. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 112–53 (2010); see also Lloyd N. Cutler & David R.
Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395, 1409–14 (1975).
317. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII.
318. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Ozone madness, GRIST (Sept. 4, 2011), http://
grist.org/article/2011-09-03-ozone-madness/ [https://perma.cc/4XGA-D8ZF]. Professor
Heinzerling was a key member of President Obama’s team at the EPA. Lisa
Heinzerling, GEO. L., https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/lisa-heinzerling/
[https://perma.cc/WD9F-686M] (last visited Jan. 9, 2020).
319. Jeremy Waldron, Accountability: Fundamental to Democracy 32 (N.Y. Univ.
Sch. of Law Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 14-13, 2014).
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Canons of Statutory Construction
Serve the Purpose of the Norm

Professor Sunstein argues that the Supreme Court has replaced the constitutional bar on delegation with various “nondelegation canons” of statutory construction, which he calls
collectively “The American Nondelegation Doctrine.”320 It, he
argues, serves the purposes of the traditional doctrine.321 In his
words, it stops “legislative shirking . . . by requiring Congress
to make the relevant judgments. . . . [E]xecutive officials cannot
seize on vague or general language to produce specified kinds
of outcomes. The legislature must authorize those outcomes in
advance, and with a high level of particularity.”322 The kinds of
outcomes for which agencies need clear legislative statements
of authorization include, to list some of Professor Sunstein’s
examples, those arising from the agency asserting the power to
act retroactively, extraterritorially, or in ways that create serious
constitutional problems, or would bring about an enormous
and transformative expansion in its regulatory authority.323

320. Sunstein, supra note 193, at 1181. Professor Sunstein sees consent of the
governed as an underenforced norm but applauds far more underenforcement
than I think necessary.
321. Professor Sunstein also gives arguments against the traditional doctrine.
First, he states that it is not judicially manageable because it requires courts to
answer a question of degree: “how much discretion is too much discretion?” Id. at
1182. This is true of the intelligible principle test, yet Professor Sunstein’s own
canons require judgments of degree. The “elephants-in-mouseholes doctrine,”
invoked when agencies find big powers in obscure grants of authority, requires
courts to make two judgments of degree: how big is an elephant and how obscure
is a mousehole. Generally, his canons are changeable, id. at 1184 (“[T]hey change
over time.”), and unclear in application, id. at 1200 (“The passage is not without
ambiguity . . . .”). Meanwhile, Chevron is of doubtful manageability because there
are several conflicting versions of the doctrine. See Jack M. Beermann, End the
Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and
Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 783, 817–29 (2010).
Second, Professor Sunstein’s argues that the traditional doctrine is of “uncertain
constitutional pedigree” because, citing Professor Mashaw, it clashes with “actual
practice during the early period of the American republic.” Sunstein, supra note
193, at 1183 (citing MASHAW, supra note 261, at 5). Yet, as I argued in Part V.B,
Professor Mashaw is wrong. Professor Sunstein also relies upon Professors Posner
and Vermeule for the related proposition that the norm lacks “clear roots . . . in
the text and in founding-era debates.” Id. (citing Posner & Vermeule, supra note
26, at 1723). But the roots were clear enough to persuade the early Supreme Court
in cases such as Fletcher v. Peck, Brig Aurora, and Gibbons v. Ogden. See supra Part II.A.
322. Sunstein, supra note 193, at 1191.
323. Id. at 1181, 1185.
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Clear statement requirements are often, but not always, sensible tools in statutory interpretation.324 However, clear statement requirements do little to stop shirking by Congress. An
example is the 1970 Clean Air Act, which, as discussed in Part
III.D, plainly authorized the agency to protect health, but allowed politicians to take credit for healthy air while shifting
blame to the EPA and the states for failing to deliver and the
economic burdens concomitant with pollution reduction.325
That is why legislators of both parties voted for it almost unanimously in 1970.326
So, yes, members of Congress are elected and must authorize
agencies to make law. But with great skill they shift blame to
the agencies for the unpopular consequences such as regulatory
protection not delivered or regulatory burdens imposed. That
is not consent of the governed.327
In sum, Professor Sunstein asserts that Congress can delegate
sweeping power to agencies if it does so bluntly. That is bizarre
because he would treat purposeful violations of the consent-ofthe-governed norm more leniently than inadvertent violations
even though the harm to the government is apt to be particularly great where Congress is most insistent that it wants to
evade responsibility.
*****
That so many highly intelligent scholars can do no better
than make such far-fetched arguments for ignoring the consentof-the-governed norm bolsters the argument for recognizing it.

324. To the extent that clear statement requirements are used to curb delegation
rather than to divine the intent of Congress, they may lead the courts away from
the intent of Congress. See John F. Manning, Lessons from a Nondelegation Canon, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1541, 1557–59 (2008).
325. David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air
Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 740, 789–98 (1983).
326. The Senate version of the act passed unopposed, 116 CONG. REC. 33,120
(1970) (73 for, 0 against); the House version provoked a lone dissenting vote, id. at
19,244 (375 for, 1 against). The conference report was agreed to by both the Senate
and House without opposition. See id. at 42,395 (Senate); id. at 42,524 (House).
327. Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy cites these delegation-related statutory
construction canons to show ongoing judicial concern with the constitutional
norm rather than to argue that the canons are an adequate substitute for the norm.
See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141–42 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION
We like the administrative state. After all, most people want
the regulatory protection we were promised agencies would
provide. That is why Congress passed the regulatory statutes.
Nonetheless, we also dislike the administrative state. After
all, most people want members of Congress to take personal
responsibility for regulations and thus to be accountable for
both the burdens imposed and the shortfalls in regulatory protection. By failing to take such responsibility, Congress pits us
against ourselves.
Many influential people benefit from Congress’s failure to
take responsibility: the agency officials who get the power,
lawyers whose income and sense of importance come from
their role in the abstruse processes that now have the last word
on regulation, and most importantly the members of Congress
who prefer to avoid responsibility for hard choices so long as
members of the opposing political party do.
The job of securing the consent of the governed the Declaration
of Independence promised, and the Constitution requires, thus
falls to the Supreme Court. It has no duty more supreme
than judging compliance with the Constitution. None of the
Constitution’s norms is more supreme than the consent of the
governed. As Justice Kagan recently wrote, “[T]he need for judicial review is at its most urgent in cases” where “politicians’
incentives conflict with voters’ interests, leaving citizens without any political remedy for their constitutional harms.”328
Yet, in response to assertions that Congress violates the
consent-of-the-governed norm by outsourcing responsibility,
the Court currently outsources its own responsibility for judgment to Congress. That is poetic injustice. It should stop. Once
the Court does its duty, Congress can do its duty.

328. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2523 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1941 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

